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COTTON SUBSIDIES

The US hypocrisy on cotton subsidies

The US's counter-notification against India's cotton subsidies is a thinly-veiled attempt at diverting attention away from its own market-distorting practices in this sector, and shifting the blame to other countries. India should expose the hypocrisy of the US on cotton subsidy, and must continue to demand, at the WTO, steep reduction in trade-distorting support provided to farmers in developed countries

TRADE AND WORLD Trade Organisation (WTO) discussions thrive on perception. Recent actions by the US seek to portray India as flouting WTO rules and distorting the global market by providing huge subsidies to cotton. Left unchallenged, the hypocrisy of the US narrative on cotton could sway WTO members, particularly the cotton-producing African countries.

So, what is the fracas on India's cotton subsidies all about? Shorn of legalese, the US has made a counter-notification at the WTO, alleging that India's subsidies to cotton have breached the limit of 10% of the value of cotton production, as stipulated in the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture.

The US contends that, during 2010-16, India's market price support to cotton was 53% to 81% of the value of the annual production. On the other hand, in its notifications, India has claimed that the market price support has rarely exceeded 1.4% of the value of production during 2010-16.

What explains the reality behind these sharply divergent statistics? The explanation lies in three variables used in calculating the domestic support for each product under the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture.

■ First, which currency to use in calculating the domestic support?

■ Second, what is the production eligible to benefit from the minimum price support?

■ Third, how many units of raw cotton are required for producing one unit of lint cotton?

While India has calculated the domestic support to cotton in terms of US dollars, the US insists that the calculations should be done in Indian rupee. Contrary to what the US insists, the methodology for calculating domestic support under the Agreement on Agriculture is not prescriptive. It provides a country the flexibility to choose the currency for calculating its domestic support.

The issue of "eligible production" is more complicated. India takes the volume of cotton procured at the minimum support price to be the eligible production. The US has argued that it should be the total production of cotton. The US

bases its arguments on the findings in a WTO dispute involving domestic support provided by South Korea to beef. However, the US contention is negated by the reality that the findings in a WTO dispute are specific to the facts of the case under consideration. What was relevant in the South Korea beef dispute may not necessarily apply in other situations, including India's minimum support price scheme.

On the point of conversion rate, the US contends that this figure is close to 3, while India has used a conversion rate of 2.35. The US appears to have ignored some key elements such as wastage, ginning and pressing cost, etc, that go into the calculation of the conversion rate.

In addition, what about the US's own subsidies to cotton? Historically, the US has provided extremely high subsidies to its cotton farmers, who are typically rich and also constitute a powerful political lobby. For instance, in 2001, the product-specific support to the American cotton farmers was as high as 74% of the value of cotton production in that year. The high cotton subsidies not only depressed the global prices, but also devastated the economies of some African countries—such as Chad and Mali—which are overwhelmingly dependent on cotton for their overall development.

The cost of production of cotton lint is much higher in the US (\$1.88 per kg in 2015-16) than in India (\$0.71 per kg in 2015-16). The US exports 80% of its cotton production and tops the list of the cotton-exporting countries, while India exported only about 16% of its cotton output in 2018.

Between 1995 and 2017, the US provided subsidy to cotton farmers worth \$38 billion through several programmes, with the top 10% of the recipients guzzling 82% of the total amount of subsidy. To make matters worse, the US dumped its highly-subsidised cotton in the international market, thereby crowding out millions of poor farmers of developing countries from the international market and undermining their livelihoods.

It is no surprise, then, that in 2003, the African countries were up in arms against the US cotton subsidies. Some observers contend that the Cancun Ministerial Meeting of the WTO in 2003 collapsed because the US found it politically inconvenient to even discuss this issue. However, given the economic devastation that the US subsidies had wrecked upon the African cotton producers, this issue unleashed strong emotions among many countries at the WTO.

In addition, during the Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting of the WTO held in 2005, the US was compelled to agree to cut its cotton subsidies "specifically, ambitiously and expeditiously." However, the US dug its heels in, and 13 years have passed without any significant real reduction in the US cotton subsidies.

Here it is also relevant to mention that the rules under the Agreement on Agriculture are rigged heavily in the favour of developed countries, such as the US. While the rules constrain India to limit its cotton subsidies to 10% of its value of cotton production, the US is not constrained by any such limit. The limit on the US is for its total subsidies to all agricultural products, without getting fettered by limits on subsidies to individual products. As the limit on the total agricultural subsidies is very high for the US, effectively the US can concentrate its subsidies in just a handful of products and still continue to remain within the WTO rules.

In conclusion, the US's counter-notification against India's cotton subsidies is a thinly-veiled attempt at diverting attention away from its own market-distorting practices in this sector, and shifting the blame to other countries. The Indian government, therefore, should expose the hypocrisy of the US on cotton subsidy, and must continue to demand, at the WTO, steep reduction in trade-distorting support provided to the farmers in developed countries.

TRAJ'S TARIFF ORDER

Make your own monthly TV bill

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We are moving towards a system that provides cable TV subscribers their right to choose channels at a lower cost

DIGITISATION OF CABLE television distribution networks has resulted in improved capacity and quality of signals of television networks. However, concerns such as lack of choice for subscribers, and non-transparency in channel pricing and in the flow of subscription revenues across the value chain, continue to prevail. The Tariff Order by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) aims to address these concerns.

The TRAI's Tariff Order covers the following:
 ■ The broadcasters have been mandated to declare the monthly maximum retail price (MRP) for each pay channel and whether a channel is a free-to-air (FTA) or a pay channel. The MRP is uniform across all delivery platform operators;

■ Bouquets cannot have any FTA channels and shall not contain any pay channel with monthly MRP greater than ₹19. In addition, bouquets cannot have standard definition (SD) and high definition (HD) versions of the same channels;

■ All distribution platform operators (DPOs) have to provide a basic pack of 100 FTA channels for a maximum network capacity fee (monthly rental) of ₹130. Additional channels beyond this will be charged in slabs of 25 SD channels at a monthly rental of ₹20;

■ The carriage fee is capped at ₹0.20 and ₹0.40 per subscriber per channel per month for SD and HD channels, respectively. This reduces as the penetration of the channel increases in its relevant market.

TRAJ's Tariff Order to change the TV distribution industry structure from B2B to B2C will lead to greater transparency across the value chain and bring parity among all distribution platforms

The Tariff Order has, therefore, changed the structure of the broadcasting industry to B2C (sell *à la carte* to consumers directly) from B2B (sell a bouquet of channels to the DPOs). This will create a system that will lead to greater transparency among the broadcasters, the DPOs and the subscribers.

This system, in fact, provides the subscribers their right to choose channels. This is unlike the current scenario,

where most of the deals between the broadcasters and the DPOs are on a fixed fee basis, leading to extra channels being pushed to the customers irrespective of their choice.

Furthermore, it is agnostic to the nature of delivery platforms, thereby bringing parity among the DPOs—both multi-system operators (MSOs) and direct-to-home (DTH) operators. The need for negotiations on content costs, which was earlier a norm for dealing with large broadcasters, thus goes away, leading to more transparent pricing. The ability of the broadcasters to preserve their profitability through strategic pricing of channels and the creation of a bouquet of channels, therefore, assumes greater significance. In addition, it will determine the incremental average revenue per user (ARPU) earned by a DPO (over and above the network capacity fee). Quality of service, distribution reach, packaging of add-on pay channels as well as value-add services will now become crucial differentiators among the DPOs.

While this is more time-consuming and may lead to challenges as the subscribers migrate from their current arrangements to the new ones, once the same is sorted out, the Tariff Order will be beneficial to the subscribers in terms of lowering the cost of viewership. However, as the subscribers opt on *à la carte* basis, new channels or the not so well-established ones may be the biggest losers, and it may lead to more consolidation in the industry.


'FREE' BANKING SERVICES

The chapter isn't entirely closed

Not resolving the issue of GST on 'free' banking services could lead to a substantial increase in the cost of banking services to customers

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RECENTLY, 'FREE' SERVICES provided by banks have been under the tax scanner. According to reports, tax authorities have issued notices to banks demanding payment of tax on free services such as ATM withdrawals and issuance of chequebook to customers who maintain a minimum account balance. Tax authorities, reportedly, take the view that this minimum balance amounts to consideration in lieu of the aforementioned services. The services are, therefore, not 'free' and are leviable to tax.

Bankers have told *FE* ('More GST pain soon: Banks may tax ATM usage, issue of cheque books, additional credit cards'; <https://goo.gl/aYDk51>) that unless the issue is clarified and notices are retracted, banks are prepared to recover GST (goods and services tax) on such supplies from their customers. Against this backdrop, I analyse the GST law, with an aim to highlight the complexities of this claim.

The cryptic FAQs

Let us start with the frequently asked questions issued by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) that are said to have clarified the position under the GST regime and brought respite to banks and their customers.

The 32-page FAQs effectively reiterate that supplies made without consideration, from non-related parties, would not be taxed. I believe they are unhelpful for taxpayers and potential taxpayers as they leave crucial questions

unanswered. Since notices allege that the services in question are supplies in exchange for consideration paid in the form of a minimum bank balance, the taxability of free services is not the dispute. Instead, the moot question is whether these services are free at all? Or does the maintenance of a minimum balance qualify as consideration? Perhaps the uncertainty would have been addressed if the CBIC had used the FAQs to clear the scope and meaning of the term 'consideration'.

Interpreting 'consideration'
 Given the lack of jurisprudence on the issue, 'consideration' can be interpreted to offer strong arguments both for and against the levy of tax on these services.

Consideration is a mandatory prerequisite for charging GST on transactions between unrelated parties. The term has been defined as payment made 'in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of supply' of services. In my view, the use of this phrase demonstrates the requirement of a nexus between the supply of

service and the consideration.

Given that only the account holders who undertake to maintain a minimum account balance are eligible to the 'free' services in question, on one hand there is merit to the argument that the two are intrinsically-linked.

However, on the other hand, if banks are able to show that services such as issuance of chequebooks and ATM withdrawals remain uninterrupted—despite the customers' failure to maintain a minimum balance—a strong case could

be made against the absence of a causal link between the service and the alleged consideration.

Further, to shed some light on the legislative intent behind the definition, a reference may be made to its proviso that excludes 'deposits made in respect of supply' from its scope. Typically, deposits are characterised as temporary in nature, where the amount in question changes hands without there being a sense of permanency to this exchange.

An analogy can be drawn between

deposits and the minimum balance maintained by account holders. Similar to deposits, the amount maintained in bank accounts continues to belong to the account holder. Therefore, it could be argued that the legislature intended for consideration to be a permanent flow, in exchange for the supply, from one person to another.

On the contrary, going by a strict, literal interpretation is also possible. It seems that the exception allowed to deposits is specifically limited to those given in respect of a supply. Therefore, there may be merit in the contention that the legislature only intended to carve an exception for deposits made in addition to the primary consideration for a supply. In the case of 'free' services offered by banks, one could argue that in the absence of a main supply, the minimum balance maintained by account holders cannot be equated with deposits under the proviso to the definition of consideration.

Based on this analysis, I believe the provisions lead to an ambiguity that raises a genuine concern for the industry and its customers. The issue has various layers of complexities and requires a clarification after a careful, detailed analysis. Given that both sides of the dispute have strong arguments in their favour, the government's failure to put to rest this issue could cause serious ramifications, including a long-drawn litigation and a substantial increase in the cost of banking services to customers.