

Opinion

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2019



FACULTY RESERVATION

Prakash Javadekar, Union HRD minister

We are confident there will be justice and reservation will continue as per the earlier system. The government will ensure that reservation for SC/ST/OBC is not hampered

Jubilant does a U-turn, but why was it so greedy first?

Given Domino's pizzas sell on the basis of the US firm's name and not Jubilant's, asking for a royalty was absurd

WHAT EXACTLY CAUSED the promoters of the Jubilant group to change their minds on the payment of a royalty fee to them by the group companies for use of the Jubilant brand is not clear. Tuesday's initial proposal, which envisaged the three group companies paying 0.25% of the annual consolidated revenues to a promoter holding company as royalty for the Jubilant brand, was withdrawn late in the evening. It is clear as daylight that Jubilant Foodworks' pizzas sell because they're sold as Domino's pizzas and the doughnuts as Dunkin' Donuts. The company is already paying them a royalty and justifiably so. There can be no conceivable reason to charge royalty for the Jubilant name.

Indeed, the growing trend by which promoters are attempting to pull out money from their companies, on one pretext or another, is disconcerting. Since many of these proposals are seen to be initiated 'in the ordinary course of business' they are not put to vote as special resolutions. However, since they are related party transactions and not part of the 'ordinary course of business', these proposals should be voted on only by minority shareholders. Unfortunately, the directors of the boards of most Indian companies appear to be willing to go along with the promoters even on proposals that are clearly unfair to small shareholders. For all the talk on improving corporate governance, going by the events of the last year, little is happening on the ground. Recently, in the case of Apollo Tyres, the board raised no objections to the managing director's re-appointment even though the remuneration was very high. It was only after minority shareholders voted against the resolution that the board decided to seek an independent view on the remuneration.

Again, the board of IL&FS clearly failed to do its job else the company would not have piled up the kind of debt that it has and would not be defaulting on its loans. Indeed, had the many nominees of banks and other institutional shareholders, as also independent directors, been more responsible, we wouldn't have seen so many companies going bankrupt. The list of companies where the directors have failed to red-flag problems is long—Ranbaxy, Fortis, Suzlon, to name a few. The trouble with corporate India and its many directors is that few are willing to stand up and call out errant promoters for fear of becoming unpopular. The sitting fees are far too lucrative to give up especially when one does not have a full-time job. There is little point in clamping down by way of rules and regulations because promoters seem to know exactly how to get around them. Again, there is little point in having more board meetings or capping the number of boards on which an individual can be a director unless directors want to improve corporate governance.

If Indian promoters, like those of Jubilant, want to charge royalties or brand fees, they need to invest in R&D, but few do. Indeed, even though it is very clear that several foreign brands and their technology—like Suzuki, for instance—are driving the sales of Indian firms, every now and then the government attempts to cap royalty payments by MNCs despite their having spent billions of dollars on developing technology and new products. This newspaper has argued that the outflows are not large. In 2017-18, the royalty and technical fees paid out by the Indian arms of a clutch of 30 MNCs were flat compared with the outgo in 2016-17 while the combined profits before tax of these arms grew 15%. Local businessmen need to build brands and invest in R&D and earn royalties the right way.

Getting real about jobs

Low competitiveness depresses hiring of regular workers

WHILE THE CONTROVERSY over whether employment in the country has not just risen slowly but has even contracted rages on—thanks to a leaked NSSO report in *Business Standard*—it is important to focus on the role of bad policy, including everything that discourages faster growth of labour-intensive exports of the type that countries like Vietnam and Bangladesh have seen. This includes the high cost of capital and poor infrastructure like electricity and expensive office/factory space and time/cost of shipments. Bangladesh's total exports, for instance, grew by 82% in 2010-16 and Vietnam's 145% versus just 17% for India. And while India's overall exports fared poorly—they rose from \$179 billion in 2010 to \$304 billion in 2018—not only have non-oil imports risen faster, those from China have soared. In the same period, overall imports rose from \$288 billion to \$466 billion and Chinese imports from \$31 billion to \$76 billion; rising imports, in turn, restrict local employment.

And there is, then, the elephant in the room, the role of bad labour policy that prevents flexibility like that of hire-and-fire—after paying due compensation—and even overtime and puts a floor to wage levels that are not in keeping with India's competitiveness; unless India is in a position to effectively stop imports via smuggling, India's productivity-adjusted labour and other costs have to be comparable with those in competitor countries like China, Vietnam and Bangladesh if local manufacturing and jobs are not to be hit.

A new study by Radhicka Kapoor and PP Krishnapriya at ICRER examines the rise of contract labour in India's already small organised sector. While total employment in the manufacturing sector was just around 50 million of India's total workforce of around 450 million, the share of the unorganised sector within this was as high as 72% in FY16. And, as the study found, the share of contract workers in total employment increased sharply from 15.5% in FY01 to 27.9% in FY16, while the share of directly hired workers fell from 61.2% to 50.4%; at 8.4%, the growth of contract employment has outstripped the growth of regular employment at 3.2% over the last decade. While the traditional view has been that states which have more rigid labour laws, and industries that are more labour-intensive, tend to use more contract labour, the study found that this wasn't necessarily true. So, while the share of contract workers rose in states like West Bengal and Maharashtra that have unfriendly labour laws, the same had happened in states like Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka that have better laws. And while the share of contract workers in the leather/handbag/footwear industry rose from 19% to 23% between FY01 and FY14, that in the automobile sector rose from 14% to 46%. And since this growing contractualisation is taking place despite contract wages rising faster than regular ones, the study concludes that contractualisation is a way to keep costs down as well as restrict the bargaining powers of trade unions while imparting flexibility to hiring and firing. So, while politicians may want to raise minimum wages, or raise them for contract workers, if this makes the industry uncompetitive, this will restrict employment growth.

Mining Equality

Allowing increased participation of women in mining is a good move, govt should work towards allowing full participation

GLOBALLY, THE VALUE-BASED, economic and development imperatives for gender equality and women's economic empowerment are well-established. Mining is a sector which has the potential to be a key driver of economic growth, development and job creation in many developing countries. Yet, while mining has been traditionally been male-dominated across the world—a 2013 report by Women in Mining (UK) and PricewaterhouseCoopers stated that the mining industry has the lowest number of women on company boards of any industry group worldwide—India actually had laws that placed several restrictions on women working in the sector. The Mines Act 1952 expressly forbade the employment of women in underground mines, and allowed them to work in above-ground mines only between 6 am and 7 pm.

Now, however, the labour ministry has amended the rules to allow women to work in underground mines during the day and in open cast mines round the clock. Even so, the yoke of discriminatory labour laws is not fully lifted—women in underground mining can only occupy "technical, supervisory and managerial" positions. While this may help mining engineers—only in 2016 did IIT-Indian School of Mines Dhanbad, the premier mining engineering institute in the country, allow female students into the mining engineering problems—it doesn't help the blue-collar women workers in mining regions. However, with a start being made, the likelihood of further change to allow women miners has gone up. As per the last round of the Annual Employment-Unemployment Survey (EUS), conducted by the Labour Bureau in the year FY16, the worker population ratio (WPR) for females aged 15 years and above was 21.7% as compared to the male WPR of 72.1%. Allowing women to work in the mining sector bodes well for curbing gender disparity and boosting equal opportunities for women.

INFLATION EXPECTATIONS

AS THE OUTPUT GAP CLOSES, WAGES WILL START RISING IN RURAL AREAS AS WELL. THIS WILL PUT PRESSURE ON FOOD INFLATION FROM BOTH THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY SIDE

CPI will start rising to around 5% in a year

WHEN HEADLINE AND core inflation diverge so sharply—as is the case in India at the moment—the key question is which eventually converges to which? Does headline eventually converge to core? Or does core converge to headline? With India's headline inflation below 3% and core inflation at almost 6%, the directionality of convergence matters crucially and will determine the outlook of inflation and monetary policy in 2019. There are good theoretical reasons, a priori, for the directionality to run either way. If core inflation were to begin asymptoting towards that, markets will start pricing in an easing cycle. In contrast, if headline inflation starts converging to core inflation, talk of rate hikes will be back on the table. The purpose of this piece is not necessarily to ask why food inflation has decelerated so much. Or what sticky core inflation is telling us about output gaps. It is simply to use India's inflation history to ask a narrower, more technical, question. What does past data tell us? Does headline inflation eventually converge to core? Or does core revert to headline?

To answer this question, the standard approach followed by Cecchetti and Moessner (2008) and Anand, Ding and Tulin (2014) is utilised and monthly CPI inflation data (year-on-year growth rates) commencing in 2002 is used. In the baseline data, CPI-IW (industrial workers) is used because that enables a longer time series. Then, running the same analysis using the new CPI combined series starting in 2011, the results don't change. For CPI-IW, core inflation is defined as headline adjusted for food and fuel. A finer dis-

SAJJID Z CHINYOY & TOSHI JAIN

Chinoy is chief India economist and Jain is an economist at JP Morgan Chase



inction is not available due to data constraints. In the case of CPI combined, core is defined as headline adjusted for food, fuel, housing, and transport or communication.

The tests that have been run suggest that, in the 2002-2012 period, shocks to food and fuel were either persistent and/or had meaningful second round effects, thereby impacting core inflation. The transmission mechanism was likely through inflation expectations, which subsequently affected wage and price behaviour and eventually impacted core prices. Over time, therefore, core converged to headline. The important role that shocks to food and fuel played in influencing household inflation expectations, and thereby subsequently seeping into core inflation, underpinned the Urjit Patel Committee's choice of headline inflation as the inflation target. Interestingly, however, these results completely turn on their head over the last few years. In other words, over the last 5 years, headline inflation has converged to core, though not completely. To check that convergence has indeed changed over time—and is not an artifact of the chosen time periods—a series of rolling regressions for both equations across sub-samples was run. The results depict that, a decade ago, it was core that used to converge to headline, but over time, headline has progressively


converged to core.

The results are both decisive and robust to (i) the choice of CPI series (CPI-IW versus CPI combined) and (ii) different definition of core inflation. But how should one make sense of these results? Prima facie, it points to the evolving role of inflation expectations. To the extent that inflation expectations were elevated and unanchored—as was the case between 2009 and 2014—it is unsurprising that shocks to food and fuel would quickly translate into a more generalised inflation through wage and price-setting behaviour. In other words, second-round effects were large, inducing core to converge to headline. However, given the adaptive nature of inflation expectations, the sharp disinflation in recent years has likely caused expectations to both moderate (visible in RBI's household surveys) and get more anchored. The implication is that second round effects are much more muted, and shocks to food and fuel prices do not propagate as strongly into core inflation. Correspondingly, core inflation is relatively more responsive to slack. In other words, transitory shocks do not get generalised as completely or as quickly. Against this backdrop, it is understandable why headline eventually converges to core inflation, ultimately reflecting underlying slack. This also perhaps explains why food infla-

tion has seen such a sharp deceleration in the last few years and yet core has remained relatively sticky.

What these results suggest is the headline inflation—expected to be in the 3% handle in the near future—will eventually start converging, over a 12-month period, towards core inflation which is currently running above 5%. If this were to come to pass, space for any monetary policy easing cycle—notwithstanding a one-off cut in February or April this year—would virtually evaporate. How would the economic transmission occur, though? It would have to be through wage dynamics. Specifically, as output gaps close, wages would be expected to rise, eventually also translating into higher rural wages, which would be expected to pressure food inflation from both the demand and supply side. Real rural wages have already begun to tick-up, though largely reflecting the disinflation in the rural economy. Expansive fiscal policy—that both expedites the closing of output gaps and targets stimulus to the rural economy to push up wages and food prices—would simply reinforce and accelerate these dynamics. If these results hold, any monetary easing in early 2019, is likely to be transient and shallow.

It is also possible that, one can look at these results and draw the wrong conclusion. If headline inflation converges to core, should RBI target core inflation instead, as developed market central banks do? Why target headline? Reaching this conclusion, however, is fraught with risk. As has been previously found, inflation expectations in India are both adaptive and rational. Consequently, the transition to the inflation targeting framework has also played a role in anchoring expectations and, therefore, de facto contributed to shocks to food and fuel having less pronounced second round effects. In effect, therefore, headline inflation gradually asymptoting to core—and not the other way around—is perhaps the best testimony to the growing efficacy of flexible inflation targeting in India. Any backsliding from there runs the risk of causing expectations to get unhinged again, and for transitory shocks to get more generalised again.



City-level data to boost governance

Changes in the way Indians consume data have yielded a deep base of personal information, from applications such as Ola and Swiggy, and insights drawn from this base can potentially solve some of the most complex and tangled governance issues

DEVASHISH DHAR

Public policy specialist, NITI Aayog
Views are personal. Twitter: @dhardevashish

THE APPROACH to solve issues through a national level analysis perished long time ago in India. Following its demise, state-level and regional analysis informed decisions on reforming governance and growth. The state-level analysis focused on wide ranging indicators such as education and health, economic growth, job creation, police force, rainfall and agriculture output, service-level benchmarks, amongst many others.

This was followed by incessant state-level studies and investment summits. Essentially, states became the fundamental unit of analysis for improving growth and development in India. However, between 2014-16, something changed in how Indians consumed data. The new government launched the Digital India programme which focused on increasing internet connectivity and provisioning of government services.

At the same time, disruptions in telecom industry yielded exponential benefits and smartphone sales continued to clock robust growth. Apps such as Netflix, Hotstar, Amazon Prime, Saavn, Gaana, and Flipkart, amongst others, fuelled the growth in data consumption and literally speak volumes about preferences of music, movies, web-series and shopping at the pin code level. Uber and Ola provide insights on traffic at road level and have already begun to assist city governments in delivering insights on traffic movements. All this builds over the behemoth of digital infrastructure—Aadhaar, payment banks, Uni-

fied Payments Interface (UPI) and India Stack.

With this solid foundation, Indian cities are in an extremely sweet spot to disrupt governance and growth in cities. NITI Aayog's *Strategy for New India@75* document outlines strategies that can help cities leverage this opportunity. Under the section, 'Modernizing City Governance for Urban Transformation', it proposes to boost city economy by creating city economic councils and tracking key economic indicators through a city dashboard. Imagine if city dashboards and economic councils have representatives and data of the private companies mentioned above. The synergies can be enormous.

Given that this is a new terrain for city governments, the document also discusses developing model municipal talent and in/outourcing guidelines to leverage efficiencies generated by technology and outsourcing. For governance, it takes a bold stance by suggesting that ward committees and area *sabhas* should be activated with a technology enabled 'Open Cities Framework' and the use of digital tools for feedback and reporting.

Under the section, 'Smart Cities for Urban Transformation', the document argues for institutionalising cities' capacities to draw benefits from city-level data. It proposes the creation of digital transformation roadmaps for cities which can take a systems approach to all digital interactions in a city, while mapping all assets and using them for key governance activ-

ities such as grievance redressal, participatory budgeting, transparent works management, and contractor payments.

It also proposes to create data observatories at city level which will help in policymaking. The highlights of such data observatories will include flexible architecture, open-source accessibility and ensuring the privacy of citizens. If implemented, these policies will empower Indian cities to unbox the benefits of data which is generated within their geographical territories.

Use of technology reduces transaction costs. Initially, the returns are slow but as you accumulate knowledge (and data), the returns are compounding in nature and, after a threshold level, they become exponential. They build over the existing data and insights drawn from this wide and deep base can potentially solve some of the most complex and tangled issues of our times.

It took India close to five decades to move from a pan-India focus and one-size-fits-all approach to a state- and regional-level focus. But in less than two decades thereafter, the focus has shifted to cities. Once the 74th Constitutional Amendment gets fully implemented, it will be a matter of few years for the best practices of city-level innovations to be replicated and scaled across other cities. Thus, it is neither too optimistic nor too romantic to believe that city-level data will provide next the wave of disruption in governance and growth.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Coalition digging its heels in

The Congress-JD(S) coalition in Karnataka appears to be digging its heels in by adopting self-protection measures on the eve of the budget session of the legislature. Despite state BJP president BS Yeddyurappa denying any attempt to topple the government, the coalition is sparing no efforts to be on guard. Yeddyurappa also denied that there were no efforts to table a no-confidence motion against the government. But with the saffron party capable of pulling the rug from under the feet of the coalition and springing a surprise, the government would do well to keep Yeddy and company at bay
— Ravi Chander, Bengaluru

Market high

With the budget out of the way, and consumer-friendly public welfare initiatives expected to run till the General Elections, markets are showing signs of resilience and are pricing-in the likely outcome of key national/global events. Regulators have done well so far to infuse liquidity in the commodity/derivative segment and enforce stringent measures to monitor trade sessions. Although a large influx of capital by foreign funds is welcome, it is important that long-term holdings by institutional investors be encouraged over speculative trading. A balanced macroeconomic strategy and stable leading indicators are the need of the hour. Business-friendly regulations on fund raising and hedging of risks can reduce the cost of borrowings, render a higher liquidity and curtail forex outflow
— Girish Lalwani, Delhi

● Write to us at feletters@expressindia.com

