




# THE IDEAS PAGE

## Good, Bad, Ugly

### Moments like Pulwama hold up a mirror to the government, media and nation



SUHASH PALSHIKAR

DIPLOMATS HAVE to be wordsmiths. So, when the foreign secretary of India used the phrases “non-military” “preemptive strikes”, they were, though clever, hardly surprising. Yet, there was something good about it.


Besides the clever phraseology, the air strikes and official statement by the government implied a twin assertion. First, that India would want to be seen as strongly responding to Pulwama going beyond the traditional restraint for which the Indian establishment is known. In terms of domestic politics, the dividend derived from such an assertion is quite obvious. At the same time, and beyond domestic politics, this assertion also sought to intimate to the international community a possible shift if Pakistan cannot be reined in by diplomatic measures.

But the official statement also sought to define the expected boundaries of this shift — that India does not want the situation to escalate into a military confrontation which, in any case, was a pre-destined miscalculation known to the MEA establishment. Any episode such as Pulwama could never turn into anything except tragic and hurtful. Whether to turn this also into a journey through a dark tunnel was the only moot question. With Balakot, India chose to opt for that journey. Immediately after the air strike, it appeared that in spite of the darkness the journey may involve, the flickering light of diplomacy (towards the world outside) and statesmanship (towards attempts to convert the moment into uncontrollable jingoism) may save the day.

The immediate aftermath of Pulwama and the airstrikes had yet another silver lining. In spite of the innuendoes from official circles about “security failures” by previous governments, the Opposition chose to respond much more responsibly than was expected, given its bitter relationship with the government. So much so, that serious questions about Pulwama, too, were brushed under the carpet.

Opposition parties correctly assessed that instead of creating a nationalist backlash, such issues may be deferred for purposes of both national interest and political prudence. Similarly, the official position and Opposition response right after the airstrikes were subdued. It could be said that both responses were mainly dictated by compulsions of the circumstances. The government’s response was circumscribed by the possible international fallout while the response by the Opposition was subdued by fear of political calculations. It looked like the journey through the dark tunnel could be quickly over. So far so good.

But the restraint shown by most Opposition parties was not reflected — even less reciprocated — in the reactions from circles “close to the establishment”. While the Gol response for international consumption had all the trappings of cunning and self-restraint, the ruling party and its friends were unable to resist the temptation to use the dark tunnel to their partisan and ideological



Suvajit Dey

advantage.

The prime minister, who has often failed to distinguish between the responsibilities of statecraft and the compulsions of political partisanship, kept using the context of Pulwama to suggest how his party and government (alone) were saviours of the pride of the country. His speech at the launch of the sainik smarak left a bad taste in the mouth. No wonder, the chief of the mother-organisation of his party was crass enough to say that the air strikes signified a fitting “shradddh” for the martyred soldiers of Pulwama (IE, February 27). He forgot that the art of leadership is in bringing out the best in your followers rather than expressing the worst of their prejudices.

If this wasn’t bad enough, the credit for representing the ugliest in this uncertain journey would surely go to the media. Ever since the Mumbai terror attacks, the overdrive of the media has been a topic of concern and discussion. In the latest episode, the media not only went overboard in its competition for eyeballs, it also engaged in a fierce competition over nationalist claims.

It is one thing for a government to choose to retaliate but quite another when the media hypnotises itself into the role of cheerleader for war games. Pulwama and the subsequent air strike by India were bound to generate considerable popular excitement and aggressive nationalism. But that inevitable outcome has been capitalised upon by the media and in the process, social media represented the most irritable and excitable sections eager to go to war with Pakistan. While the electronic media was raging, what with imagined picturisations of the air strike, the print media did not want to be left behind and in many cases, headlines declared a blow to Pakistan and worse.

Predictably, within a short time from this unfolding of the good, bad and ugly, real complications have begun to present themselves. A nation drowned in the din of self-declared victory would be unable to sanely grapple with those complications. While the degeneration of the media into a tool to whip up sentiment and shape public anxiety

is bad in itself, within hours of the Balakot air strike, the abdication of responsibility by the media has aggravated this challenge.

On the morning after Balakot, we got into eulogising the sophistication behind the words “non-military preemptive” action. That was fine as a statement, but not enough either to influence the global community or to deter Pakistan from further action. In fact, India might have given Pakistan’s military establishment a perfect excuse. Since India claimed that it had attacked, it left the adversary with no option but to be seen as doing something in “defence” — so the irresponsible character of the state of Pakistan gets shrouded in its victimhood and its action masquerades as self-defence. Once that has happened, the 24 hour glory of India’s retaliation pales in the backdrop of clouds of a war.

Moments like Pulwama are indeed a test of tenacity — of governments and of the nation. It is not easy for any government not to retaliate instantly, because public opinion requires it and such action is needed also to earn the attention of the world. However, the complex question is how to act and the more complex issue is how to present that act. To warn the terrorist groups and their patrons, an action has to be lethal. But at the same time, such action needs to be kept low-key so that only the sufferer realises its effects. So, the question is not whether a government should have taken this or that action. The question is whether the brave soldier deserves to suffer for the publicity that the government may seek out of such action.

Unfortunately, Pulwama happened at a time when we have a government that lives off publicity and it happened at a time when the government was running short of publicity. Unfortunately, it also happened at a time when as a nation, we are more eager for exemplary rather than efficient retaliation. When tokenism rules, substantive policy, whether in the realm of security or elsewhere, is bound to be elusive.

*The write taught political science and is based at Pune*

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## WHAT THE OTHERS SAY

“The scope for an accidental proxy war (between India and Pakistan) breaking out is apparent. But the stakes being so high, there is probably more chance that the superpowers will restrain rather than egg on their regional clients.”

—THE INDEPENDENT

## Wider and deeper

### India’s strategic calculus to eliminate Pakistan-sponsored terror must be multi-dimensional



TEJINDER S SAHRAWAT

THE DEVASTATING ATTACK on the CRPF convoy on February 14 at Pulwama has caused outrage in the country. The Jaish-e-Mohammad, Masood Azhar’s terrorist outfit located in Pakistan, has owned up to the attack. Our diplomatic endeavours have ensured that the attack has been condemned in capitals across the world, including in Riyadh and Ankara, which routinely support Pakistan in its rants on Kashmir at the conferences of the Organisation of Islamic Countries. US National Security Adviser John Bolton stated that the US supports India’s right to self defence. India undertook an anti-terrorist air operation, destroying terrorist bases in Pakistan. This will have some salutary effect on Pakistan, but will it eliminate the terrorism emanating from the country?

In the strategic calculus of the Pakistan army, maintaining a controlled degree of hostility vis-a-vis India is essential. A hostile relationship with India enables the Pakistan army to maintain its primacy in that country. In addition, there is the desire for vengeance against India, which Pakistan blames for its dismemberment in 1971. The army has created an ecosystem in which terrorist groups can exist safely. These groups provide a cheaper option to an economically-weak Pakistan to bleed India. With the likely withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, the Pakistan deep state considers itself well poised to divert the products of its terrorist factories to India. Without a well-thought out strategy, we will be reacting to one terrorist attack after another. Such a strategy will need to be multi-dimensional.

The first element of our strategy must be to demonstrate to the Pakistan army that India can cause it excruciating pain if the ISI continues to sponsor terrorism against India. This requires creating a military capability which can cause significant damage at short notice. We do have conventional military superiority over Pakistan. However, the lack of political resolve and our inability to fight a two-front war has emboldened Pakistan. It is essential that our defence budget be enhanced over the next few years to build up a sufficient capability to act as a devastating deterrent. Alongside, we need to reorganise our military to be able to operate at short notice. Essential reforms are needed in the higher defence organisational structure to ensure efficiency and professionalism. These reforms must not be marred by political short-sightedness and bureaucratic self-interest.

The second element of the policy is coercive diplomacy, which has been steered well by our political leadership and foreign office. We have been able to successfully project Pakistan as the epicentre of terrorism. This lowers Pakistan’s image in the comity of nations, minimising foreign investment and economically weakening the country. Some deft diplomacy has also ensured that Pakistani workers find it difficult in foreign lands, including in Gulf countries, which adversely affects remittances. The cacophony demanding the total isolation of a country of the size and population of Pakistan is not a realistic expectation.

*The writer is a retired Lieutenant General of the Indian army and former director general, Defence Intelligence Agency*

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

**ABOUT THE FARMER**

THIS REFERS TO the editorial, ‘Little, late’ (IE, February 28). If the Centre was serious about the welfare of farmers, it should have come out with the PM-Kisan scheme much earlier. By announcing this scheme at a time when the Lok Sabha elections are due, the government is hoping to reap political mileage from the plight of farmers. The lack of time will be hurdle in its implementation.

**Anish Esteves, Mumbai**

**WAR AND PEACE**

THIS REFERS TO the editorial, ‘The day after’ (IE, February 28). The editorial is right in stating that our “TV warriors” should exercise some restraint. It is very easy to shout and raise slogans in TV studios. It is shocking that war strategies are being discussed on television. Let army generals take decisions about the prevailing situation. One cannot be a patriotic by mere lip service.

**Hitesh Parmar, Rajkot**

**LETTER OF THE WEEK AWARD**

To encourage quality reader intervention, The Indian Express offers the Letter of the Week award. The letter adjudged the best for the week is published every Saturday. Letters may be e-mailed to [editpage@expressindia.com](mailto:editpage@expressindia.com) or sent to The Indian Express, B-1/B, Sector 10, Noida-UP 201301. Letter writers should mention their postal address and phone number.

**THE WINNER RECEIVES SELECT EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS**

**FLAWED DEMOCRACY**

THIS REFERS TO the article, ‘Slipping on democracy’ (IE, February 26). There is lack of substantive democracy in India as there is a decline in civil liberties. Though the conduct of elections reflects the strength of democratic institutions, the undermining of autonomous institution like the CBI, RBI and the NSSO, besides vigilantism, reflects poorly on India’s democracy. Moreover, the first past the post system needs to be reviewed. Substantive democracy could be brought with greater participation, restoring autonomy of institutions and accepting dissent and criticism.

**H Upadhyay via e-mail**

## The best way to vote

### On EVMs, we may be asking the wrong questions



SUBHASHIS BANERJEE AND SUBODH SHARMA

WHETHER OR NOT to use EVMs (electronic voting machines) for elections in India has been a raging debate of late. There have been claims of hacking of EVMs and counter-claims of impossibility, steadfast assurances about their safety from election commissioners and technocrats, open challenges through ECI (Election Commission of India)-sponsored “hackathons”, and even live television shows by masked hackers alleging conspiracies.

Public arguments on computer security in India have often been outrageous. On the one hand there have been fatalistic claims that all computer systems can be hacked and that it is just a matter of time before they will be. On the other hand, there have been claims that EVMs are foolproof and cannot be hacked. In fact, the very same president, many other luminaries, what she actually did, it should be possible to prove that the claim is false. Without determining the correct way to vote, we are not in a position to judge whether the system is safe or not. The fact that there have been live television shows by masked hackers alleging conspiracies, and the fact that the ECI has not been able to provide a guarantee that it cannot be ultimately hacked, are not sufficient to establish trust, either formally through verifiable proofs, or even informally through the media. The fact that these claims are being made in the state of ECI design, and the fact that the ECI should be tamper-proof, through any direct or even

Correctness demands that all votes are accurately counted and there are no false or duplicate votes. Secrecy demands that it should be impossible to determine who an individual voted for, provided the voting is not completely lopsided for any candidate or any social or political groups. Anonymity — indistinguishability from a specified number of other voters — follows from secrecy. Secrecy and anonymity are necessary conditions for coercion-free voting, though the converse is not true. Sufficient conditions for coercion-free voting will require methods and processes beyond an EVM.

Verifiability demands that it should be possible to prove to every voter individually that his/her vote has been accurately recorded. This is not a simple task. It requires that the ECI should be able to provide a guarantee that it cannot be ultimately hacked, and that the ECI should be able to provide a guarantee that it cannot be ultimately hacked. The fact that there have been live television shows by masked hackers alleging conspiracies, and the fact that the ECI has not been able to provide a guarantee that it cannot be ultimately hacked, are not sufficient to establish trust, either formally through verifiable proofs, or even informally through the media. The fact that these claims are being made in the state of ECI design, and the fact that the ECI should be tamper-proof, through any direct or even

side-channel attacks. Fault tolerance demands that the system should be resilient to network and component failures. In particular, there should never be any data loss. Consistency demands that the design and implementation of all EVMs must be identical, and provably so at all stages of the election.

Finally, auditability and self-certifiability demand that it should be possible to verify the above invariant conditions at all stages of voting, including before the start, at any time during voting, and after the voting ends. The EVM should be able to self-certify and provide proofs of all the above invariants at any stage.

Some of these may appear to be dependent or even contradictory at the first glance, but careful reflection should convince the reader that they are, in fact, not. Designing a provably-correct EVM satisfying all the above properties is as yet an unsolved problem of computer science. Rebecca Mercuri, a computer scientist and the original proponent of a VVPAT based design, claimed that the verification of a design for an EVM such as above will be an intractable problem. It may well be so, though that does not suggest that rigorous verification of suitable design abstractions cannot be worked out.

The crucial question, then, is to precisely evaluate to what extent does the ECI’s EVM satisfy the above properties and how does it compare with manual paper based ballot? For example, merely tallying the EVM count with the manual VVPAT count, without

guaranteeing that there is no spurious voting, does not establish correctness, even with statistical sampling. VVPATs, or even secure strongrooms, do not guarantee against pre-designed adversarial, side-channel or Trojan attacks.

This is not to say that the ECI’s EVM is necessarily a worse option than manual ballot which does not even guarantee correctness and, at best, only approximately satisfies secrecy, anonymity and fault-tolerance. Manual ballot, however, has the advantage of not taking away agency from the poll officials, whose understanding of the poll process enables them to improvise on the spot to try and ensure correctness. In contrast, the obscurity of an EVM makes its correctness analysis absolutely crucial.

Public posturing by the ECI, based on pronouncements by a hand-picked set of experts, does not engender confidence. For informed risk assessment it is imperative that the complete design, analysis and the hardware synthesis specifications be made public at the earliest so that the EVM may be subjected to rigorous scrutiny by the general public, institutions, political party representatives and experts. Security by obfuscation belongs to the time of Julius Caesar and is unacceptable in the modern age.

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