



ILLUSTRATION: ROHNIT PHORE

EJAZ GHANI

The author is lead economist at the World Bank



Reshaping social protection in a changing India

India's social protection needs to be reshaped to address increased poverty vulnerability and increased uneven playing field. The declining share of labour in total income and accumulation of capital wealth in the hands of a few have raised concern

INDIA, ONE OF THE fastest growing economies in the world, has a social protection system that may be outdated. Its social protection was founded in the 1970s, when half of the population was chronically poor, and most of them lived in rural areas. India's economy has undergone a sea change during the last three decades. Increased investments in physical and human infrastructure, rapid urbanisation, young demographics and productivity-enhancing reforms have increased the pace of economic growth. India is urbanising at 100 times the pace at which the UK had urbanised, and the country's urban population will soon reach 600 million people, twice the size of America's. Although economic growth has reduced poverty rate, the pace of poverty reduction has slowed down, and poverty vulnerability also has increased. India still has the largest number of people on

earth living in near poverty, and even though they may not be currently poor, they are highly vulnerable to falling back into extreme poverty. Nearly 80% of jobs in India are created in the small informal enterprises, and these come without a social protection. Social protection systems in rich countries were developed at a time of "jobs for life," and such traditional social protection systems were seldom adopted in India. The coverage of formal social insurance in India remains in single digits, with virtually no increase detected over the past decade. Disruptions brought about by the introduction of the goods & services tax (GST) and demonetisation may have come with heightened risks to the poorest households, due to the increased burden of compliance on small and informal firms. India's current social protection system is not well developed to deal with contingency risks.

Future growth may also become less inclusive and less distribution neutral. The Fourth Industrial Revolution and technological innovation have increased productivity growth, but also slowed down the pace of job creation globally, especially in the manufacturing sector. Capital is increasingly substituting for labour, and the share of labour in value-added is declining. A rising tide is no longer lifting all the boats. Improving social protection against increased contingency risks and poverty vulnerability requires second generation challenges of expanding social protection instruments to deal with new risks.

The traditional approach to social protection was based on the view that there is a clear trade-off between growth versus equity, and increased social protection will create moral hazard problems, and compromise growth. However, empirical evidence has shown that social protection also provides dynamic efficiency gains to the economy through positive impacts on productivity. Increased social protection contributes to a faster pace of economic growth by allowing individuals to better manage risk/return choices.

Over-reliance on the traditional mode of providing social protection, through government and publicly-financed programmes, restricts the potential for scaling up social protection, due to fiscal constraints. There is a huge potential for maximising finance for social protection through increased public and private partnerships (PPPs), as it broadens the pool of potential financing to maximise social protection. The PPP model, which is well developed in building physical infrastructure in India, is still in its infancy in the development of social infrastructure. Given the growing demand for social services, operator-led PPPs provide an opportunity for innovative and collaborative service delivery in scaling up social infrastructure in India.

Targeted credit, livelihood interventions, crop insurance, new healthcare facilities, education, and low-income targeted public housing are examples where social protection can be scaled up through increased PPP. The PPP model transfers operational risks from the state body to the private partner and forces the private sector to take a long-term social view of the project. Social protection could be scaled up to help informal sector workers. Once basic protections are in place, people could keep upgrading their security with various progressively-subsidised schemes. Social protection can also help take pressure out of minimum wages when these are set too high.

In addition, there is a huge potential for scaling up the participation of com-

munities as a vehicle for delivering social protection. For example, lagging educational enrolments. These can be traced to low community participation in education service delivery, especially for girls. This requires placing investment funds at the local community level and giving the local communities a stronger voice in the allocation of these funds. Given a history of inefficient central planning, and the shift towards competitive federalism, it opens new doors for increased local community participation as a tool for a more effective social protection system.

Women shoulder a disproportionate share of unpaid work, and gender imbalances in the distribution of family care work constitute a root cause of women's economic and social disempowerment. While the role of gender in social protection is complex, increased focus on the types of risks tackled by women need attention. Far more can be done in terms of integrating gender into the design and implementation of social protection, including policies that enable women to better balance family and job agenda.

India's declining return on public spending on poverty programmes is an emerging challenge. The current social protection programme has not responded well to the growing spatial diversity in living standard and poverty rate within India. A key reason for this is that while poverty is getting increasingly concentrated in the lagging regions, the absorptive capacity for social protection in lagging regions is also much weaker, due to institutional weaknesses, and often handicapped by misidentification of beneficiaries. This reduces the poverty reduction impact of social programmes. A combination of government, private sector and local community participation could address institutional deficiencies, and increase return on investments in social protection and poverty reduction. Outdated information on poverty and employment indicators needs to be updated.

India's social protection needs to be reshaped to address increased poverty vulnerability and increased uneven playing field. The declining share of labour in total income and accumulation of capital wealth in the hands of a few have raised concern. We need new ways of scaling up social protection for 80% of the population in India who have no or little access to social protection. There are many options available for maximising financing for social protection, including scaling up partnerships between public, private sector and local communities, and increasing progressivity in tax base that complements labour income taxation with the taxation of capital, in a country where the richest 1% hold more than 50% of the country's wealth.

There is a huge potential for maximising finance for social protection through increased PPPs, as it broadens the pool of potential financing to maximise social protection

India has a very low tax-to-GDP ratio; if higher tax revenue targets are fixed, they must be achieved by bringing more taxpayers into the tax net

DIRECT TAX COLLECTIONS

Can we have a fair assessment?

DINESH KANABAR

The author is CEO, Dhruva Advisors



THE FISCAL YEAR HAS just ended, and like every other year, there is a review of tax collections at the Centre, both direct and indirect taxes. It has become a norm to measure the efficiency of the tax office by taking into account the taxes collected vis-à-vis the target. Early reports seem to suggest that the direct tax collection will be about 15% short of the ₹12 lakh crore target. The target this year had been considerably enhanced to take into account new taxpayers and the increased income in the formal sector as a result of demonetisation. What does this shortfall indicate?

As a start, we need to appreciate that the government measures its revenues on a cash basis, i.e. the ₹12 lakh crore target represents the direct taxes actually collected by the government net of the refunds issued. It is common knowledge that, virtually from the month of October, the top of large refunds is closed, and refunds determined thereafter are paid over only in the beginning of the next fiscal year.

In order to address the concerns of the taxpayer on high-pitched assessments and recoveries made with respect to demands arising as a result thereof, the law was amended to provide that if a taxpayer paid 20% of the tax demanded, the balance demand would be stayed till the disposal of the first appeal. This 20% payment can be contested if demands arise as a consequence of additions made for which there are favourable court orders. In practice, high-pitch assessments are now raised and assessed called upon to make payment of 20% of the tax demanded without even waiting for the mandatory 30-day period provided in the law. What was meant to be an assessee-friendly provision has now become a revenue-raising provision.

It is also quite routine for the tax office to ask taxpayers to make payment of tax deducted at source (TDS) due in April, before March 31 itself, and enhancing collections for the fiscal year. Obviously, this collection gets set-off in the succeeding years!

As such, while we compare the collections vis-à-vis the targets, it is pertinent to note several short-term measures that have been undertaken to bump up tax collections for the year. Towards this, we've had some interesting developments this year. First, there has been a fervent demand by the revenue to collect taxes where stay of demand is granted by the tax tribunal in accordance with the provisions of law. A litigation is already afoot on this subject. Second, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) called upon appellate commissioners to pass "good" appellate orders as would result in enhancement of assessments. This has also come up before a judicial challenge. Finally, the CBDT has written to the commissioners asking them to take "all possible actions" to recover taxes. Without doubt, it is the duty of the revenue to collect taxes that are due by an assessee. The unfortunate part is that the use of the words "all possible actions" is prone to be interpreted by many at the ground level to taking coercive steps and forcing assesses to pay taxes that may not necessarily be due.

I may hasten to add that this is a recurring saga and, to that extent, there is a window dressing that happens in all the budgets. To my mind, increase in collection of revenues is a direct factor of increase in the taxable income of assesses and the increased compliance on account of widening of the tax base. To have a target for collection of revenues using any other barometer would mean passing of assessment orders that are high-pitched and that seek to tax income not earned by the assessee. We have witnessed examples of how high-pitched transfer pricing orders were passed or how infusion of capital was treated as revenue. The only other measurement is the expansion of the taxpayer base. India has one of the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios and it's important that if higher tax revenue targets are fixed, they are achieved by bringing those taxpayers into the tax net who have consistently remained outside of it. Creating high-pitched assessments that cannot be sustained in appeals only clogs up the judicial system. The current approaches to augment tax collections may not resonate well with India Inc, and do not further the objective of the government that wants to see India among the top-50 countries in the Ease of Doing Business index.

Judging a country's development status

Special and differential treatment still holds the key for developing countries

ANIL K KANUNGO

The author is professor, LBSIM, and former senior faculty, IIFT, Delhi



THE ISSUE OF SPECIAL AND differential treatment (S&D) has resurfaced in a contentious manner in the WTO negotiations as the US started redefining the rules of the game again. This was possible to an extent because Jair Bolsonaro, the President of Brazil, agreed to forgo S&D treatment at the US.S&D treatment has been one of the cardinal principles of WTO functioning to keep the developing and developed countries under one roof and to sustain the interest of developing countries in multilateralism.

Since the inception of GATT, the rules of multilateral trade policy regime haven't adequately addressed the needs and concerns of developing countries. The adjustment costs borne by these countries in adapting to a changed environment have been disproportionately high. As a result, developing countries argue that taking on multilateral commitments and obligations would be difficult as they are currently in different stages of economic, financial and technological developments. Leaders of these countries further insist that special advantages and flexibilities may be provided to them so that they are in a position to adopt appropriate national policies to support their trade regime. This, in essence, came to be known as S&D provisions.

However, the concept and interpretation of S&D provisions have changed over the years. From GATT to Uruguay Round

(UR) to the establishment of the WTO in 1995, S&D provisions have undergone dramatic changes. Prior to the UR, the focus of S&D treatment was to recognise the special problem of development faced by developing countries and offer necessary flexibilities to pursue policy options appropriate for industrialisation and economic development, whereas in the UR it was geared towards recognising the special problems that developing countries may face in the implementation and signing the agreement as a single undertaking. Such a shift in focus tends to provide limited policy flexibilities for developing and least developed countries (LDCs) to negotiate on crucial issues such as agriculture, NAMA and services.

During the Doha Round of negotiations, the issue of S&D gained prominence as it had a direct bearing on the overall development dimension of developing countries. It was realised that to empower developing countries, it is important to strengthen S&D provisions. Member countries in the Doha Declaration agreed that all S&D treatment provisions should be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational.

However, negotiations on S&D provisions for so many decades have led to serious differentiation between developed and developing countries, as it has become difficult to identify and assess countries with 'developing-developed' status as S&D



provisions were primarily meant only for developing countries. According to these, it is only the developing countries that need to be benefiting from the system.

Currently, the US, under the leadership of Donald Trump, feels that many developing countries are taking the advantage of the provisions and the system because the way they have declared themselves as developing countries under self-declaration and self-selection is not correct, rather it's mischievous or misleading. Trump is of the view that some developing countries have become major players in global markets in their own right. Their exports have grown to equate almost half of total world exports, with a group of largest developing countries accounting for some

three-quarters of that share. Thus, the US believes such developing countries should be declared as 'developed countries' instead of them being called 'developing'.

The US, in an attempt to redefine S&D provisions, has proposed to limit WTO's practice of allowing countries to self-declare their developing status in order to receive special treatment. The US expects all large players—advanced or emerging—to play by the same rules. China, India and others have reiterated that their self-declaration is appropriate in the WTO context, highlighting the importance of S&D treatment for development. They argue that holding a high share in world trade doesn't necessarily make a country 'developed'. China, India and others rebut that per

capita indicators have priority when assessing development levels, and it's not the share in global trade beyond certain percentage points that can disqualify them to be termed as 'self-selection or self-declaration developing country'.

Yet, in practice, the issue of heterogeneity across developing member countries and differentiation is seen. Implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) has witnessed significant differentiation as countries self-determine their need for transition periods and technical assistance. Nine developing members have notified their readiness to immediately implement all of their obligations, and 30 others—including Brazil and China—immediately implemented more than 75% of their commitments. T&D has also recently decided to give up S&D provisions.

This possibly convinces the US to take a fresh look at revisiting the terms and conditions of S&D provisions. To bridge the developed-developing country dichotomy among WTO members, a combination of actions may be considered. Countries can follow Taiwan's example—and now Brazil's—and not claim differentiated treatment, without the need to first declare themselves as 'developed'. However, developing member countries argue technical assistance and capacity-building support for development and reform in developing economies is essential for success, and is in the interest of both the recipients and providers of assistance.