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COMMITTEE OF CREDITORS

An institution of public faith

The Committee of Creditors must build its capacity to distinguish a viable firm from an unviable one, and ensure rescue of only viable firms and closure of only unviable ones, in the interest of the economy

IN ITS LONG TITLE, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, specifies its objectives. It is reorganisation and insolvency resolution (reorganisation) of certain persons. The purpose of such reorganisation is maximisation of value of assets of the person concerned to promote entrepreneurship and availability of credit and balance the interests of all its stakeholders.

The IBC provides for corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP). It reor-

ganses commercial aspects from judicial aspects, and empowers and facilitates the Committee of Creditors (CoC) to take commercial decisions in a CIRP. The commercial decisions of the CoC are not ordinarily open to any analysis, evaluation or judicial review by the adjudicating authority or the appellate authority, and hence not justiciable.

The IBC envisages a resolution plan for reorganisation of a defaulting firm. The selection and approval of the best resolution plan requires two abilities: namely, the ability to restructure the lia-

bilities and the ability to take commercial decisions. In contrast with operational creditors (OCs) who may pursue immediate realisation of their dues, financial creditors (FCs) generally have the resilience to wait for realisation of their dues post-reorganisation. They have also the ability to determine if a resolution plan will achieve the objectives of the IBC. In view of their abilities, the CoC comprises FCs. The CoC, therefore, has a duty to take commercial decisions that further the objectives of the IBC and do not allow the interests of FCs overshadow the interests of the firm.

A CIRP entails a large variety of commercial decisions by OCs, FCs, insolvency professionals (IPs), the CoC and resolution applicants. This article, however, enumerates four key commercial decisions that a CoC is required to take in a CIRP, to reorganise the firm as a going concern to maximise the value of its assets.

1. A firm in a market economy fails to deliver on account of two broad reasons. First, it carries on a business that is no more viable for exogenous reasons such as innovation. Most such firms have economic distress and are unviable. However, a few of them may have resources to change the business line and become viable. Second, the firm is not doing well for endogenous reasons such as its inability to compete in the market place, while other firms in the same business are doing well. Most such firms have financial distress and are viable. However, a few of them may have significantly depleted their resources and become unviable. The CoC must correctly identify if the firm under a CIRP is viable or not and must rescue a viable, viable firm, and close a failing, unviable one.

2. If the firm is viable, the CoC must visualise the resolution plan required for the reorganisation of the firm. The resolution plan may entail a change of management, technology or product portfolio; acquisition or disposal of assets, businesses or undertakings; restructuring of ownership, balance sheet or organisation, etc. Much in the same way a promoter invites subscription for shares in an IPO, the CoC must create visibility of the underlying value of the firm and invite and encourage appropriate resolution plans for the reorganisation of the firm. It must express its mind as to what kind of resolution applicant can reorganise the firm, keeping in view its complexity and scale of business; what can possibly address the failure by a firm; what are the parameters to assess the viability and feasibility of resolution plans, etc, to enable prospective resolution applicants design and submit competing resolution plans for the reorganisation of the firm.

3. The CoC must ensure that the firm continues as a going concern and its value does not deteriorate during a CIRP. For this purpose, it must appoint a competent IP who can run the business of the firm as a going concern at its optimum potential, provide complete, correct and timely information about the firm to resolution applicants for the design of resolution plans, and safeguard the assets of the firm. It must facilitate inter-set finance, and cooperate in detection of avoidance transactions, wherever required. It must expedite various tasks for the closure of the CIRP at the earliest.

4. The IBC envisages the CoC to consider only those resolution plans that (i) have been received from credible and capable resolution applicants; (ii) comply with the applicable laws; (iii) are feasible and viable; (iv) have the potential to address the default; and (v) have the provision for effective implementation of the plan. These considerations ensure that the resolution plan achieves reorganisation of the firm as a going concern, on a sustained basis. Of the plans that meet these requirements, the CoC must approve that resolution plan that maximises the value of the assets of the firm, irrespective of realisation for creditors under the plan.

The CoC also takes a few other decisions along with approval of a resolution plan. It may approve restructuring of realisations for FCs to enhance maximisation of value along the sharing the realisations under the plan between FCs and OCs or between classes of FCs or OCs, or exemptions from taxes and duties sought for implementation of the plan, etc. It is doubtful if these are strictly commercial decisions and, therefore, beyond scrutiny. In any case, the IBC does not mandate consideration of these aspects while approving a resolution plan, as these may not have a bearing on the viability and feasibility of the plan. Therefore, the CoC must not discard a resolution plan that maximises the value of the assets of the firm just because it yields realisations in the future for FCs or yields relatively lower realisation for them.

It is important to note that commercial decisions are not amenable to a precise mathematical formula. It is not that a firm is viable, or a resolution plan is viable and feasible, where the realisations for FCs under the plan exceeds liquidation value of the firm. In fact, it requires considerable commercial dexterity and acumen. The CoC must build its capacity to distinguish a viable firm from an unviable one, and ensure rescue of only viable firms, and closure of only unviable ones, in the interest of the economy.

The CoC must ensure the firm continues as a going concern and its value does not deteriorate during a CIRP. It must appoint a competent IP who can run the business of the firm as a going concern

Doing away with physical meetings?

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The (ir)relevance of physical meetings—of shareholders in this era of e-voting

THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER dictionary defines a 'meeting' as "an act or process of coming together" or as "an assembly for a common purpose". Corporate law contemplates two types of shareholder meetings—the annual general meeting (AGM) and the extraordinary general meeting—whose purpose is to arrive at decisions after discussions and vote on the proposed resolutions.

The ordinary business, which is the adoption of accounts, declaration of dividend, appointment of auditors and directors, is left out of the purview of postal ballots by the Companies Act, indicating that the legislature intended that these matters need to be voted on at an AGM. However, SEBI and securities laws (often at variance with the Companies Act) have a listing agreement (for 'listed companies') which, *inter alia*, mandates electronic voting for ordinary business. The electronic vote is received by the company prior to the meeting date and the members who attend the meeting may fill in ballot slips at the venue. The aggregate of electronic and ballot votes are the results declared after the meeting.

Take a mid-level listed company with, say, 10,000 members. Usually about 50 members would be physically present at the meeting. The promoter group usually controls 40% and more of voting power. Shareholders are geographically scattered. Electronic voting is used by promoters and all institutional investors. Physical votes at the meeting typically account for less than 1% of the votes received in all.

Ordinary business to be transacted at an AGM includes the declaration of dividend. Shareholders can decrease but not increase the rate of dividend as recommended by directors. It is illogical to assume that any shareholder will ever demand such a reduction.

Adoption of accounts is another resolution that cannot be commented on by a non-finance background individual.

Annual reports today are really technical with new accounting standards, increased corporate governance and consequent reporting. It is difficult for even a finance professional to meaningfully analyse consolidated balance sheets of very large companies that have umpteen subsidiaries and are involved in many business activities.

Quarterly results have to be published and all important developments have to be reported to the bourses regularly. Most corporates have regular interaction with analysts. So, the accounts or any technicality therein are never really 'discussed' at an AGM. Appointments of auditors and directors are also not really discussable at a general meeting as individual shareholders are unlikely to have a contrary point of view in these matters. Special business can be conducted by postal ballot or electronic voting. This also does not warrant a physical meeting of shareholders. This article is not meant to show disregard for the capability and understanding of the average individual shareholder, but to address the issue of whether the purpose of a shareholders' meeting is really served under the current legal framework?

Share splitting and lower face values have made it possible for a person to have invested as little as ₹100 in shares and be entitled to attend an AGM. Is it really worth his or her time to spend half a day, besides the expense on transportation, to attend and vote at an AGM? The shareholder 'mafia' in each city comprises of such shareholders who demand various favours at the meeting for their 'silence'. Electronic and postal voting recognise the principle of voting rights being proportional to shareholding rather than 'one person, one vote' as was the old practice in pre-electronic vote era.

In summary, there is no value-add to the knowledge of shareholders about the performance of the company at the forum of physical meetings. The authorities must seriously consider immediately getting away with the concept of mandatory physical meetings for all companies. Electronic voting ensures shareholders' supremacy in the corporate management structures. The time has come to review and revisit the purpose served by physical meeting of shareholders in this era of electronic voting and other issues raised above by all the stakeholders, professionals and authorities.

NBFCs

NON-BANKING FINANCIAL companies (NBFCs) in India constitute a key frontier of economic stability by functioning outside the purview of the formal banking system. Since September 2018, capital access constraints have hampered operational competencies of NBFCs and driven the need to inject liquidity into their systems. As NBFCs have been grappling with higher borrowing costs and tighter liquidity positions over the last six months, the race to explore new avenues for raising capital has gained momentum.

Having braved a lull, 2019 is the year of revival for the sector, with some NBFCs initiating the process of raising capital while others already raising capital via retail bonds, dollar bonds and dollar loans. A rise in the number of deals and bilateral assignments apparently dominating securitisation markets in India is bolstering the capacity of NBFCs to edge to the underserved. The competitive edge of shadow banking institutions has been boosted and their capacity for extending credit to the priority sector has been strengthened on the back of guidelines issued last year that facilitate blended lending and co-origination agreements between NBFCs and banks. This is a key development that could open new funding avenues for NBFCs and lay the groundwork for their sustained growth and development.

On a path to diversify liability profile

Volatility in the demand and supply side of financial markets presents a unique opportunity to NBFCs and HFCs to re-engineer their operations for FY20

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IL&FS defaults, corporate finance issues concerning a large mortgage player, and a couple of ratings downgrades in the sector have led to a volatile undercurrent in liquidity conditions since September 2018. With the debt market grinding to a halt on account of these developments, lenders which include money market players have undertaken a stock check of their portfolio and re-evaluated the positions of companies. Fresh lending limits and revised pricing strategies have been implemented for companies after ranking them on the basis of their risk profile assessments. The changes have impacted NBFCs and housing finance companies (HFCs) and several small to large A and

AAA rated entities in varying degrees.

Liability management has become a key focus area for companies, a factor that remained largely unheeded in the last five years. The net income margins of the sector have been impacted with growth rates witnessing significant reduction on account of asset-liability mismatches (ALM) and interest rate volatilities, leading to the re-rating of the entire sector. These developments have led to the emergence of new avenues for raising debt capital, including retail issuance of NCDs, overseas dollar borrowings and dollar bonds. Given the appetite of retail investors and foreign institutional players to invest in sound financial companies with strong risk management, it presents



a unique opportunity to diversify the liability profile and reduce dependence on banks and debt market players like mutual funds and insurance companies. Sensing a unique business opportunity in the current financial environment, banks are hiking their pound of flesh by hiking rates and seeking higher risk participation from even tiered players.

A significant development in the current context has been the revival of the co-origination model for retail asset classes like vehicles, equipment and tractors. The model was successfully executed by the renowned foreign banks in the late 1990s and later replicated by the country's top two private banks in the early 2000s. The application of the co-origination model

under the new RBI guidelines can be a game changer and a strong alternative in the liability franchise for NBFCs, given the risk participation and vast business opportunity presented by the informal segment. A doorstep servicing model, strengthening balance sheets of banks and cheaper funds have the potential to greatly enhance the distribution outreach and effective penetration of NBFCs in the retail segment and MSME sector in India.

An in-depth analysis points to the fact that the entire sector has been divided into two parts. At one level, companies having secured lending and good asset quality with tenured presence and retail franchise are being courted by debt market players with a heightened appetite to lend to these

companies at comparatively softer rates. At another level, companies specifically in the real estate business having limited tenured presence with wholesale booked and unsecured lending books are getting increasingly isolated in the debt market. There remains lurking apprehension about the asset quality and ALMs of these companies, adversely impacting their ability to service their liabilities.

Capital infusion by the government, resolution of big-ticket NPAs and improved capital adequacy injecting fresh liquidity in the system have significantly bolstered the banking system in the last six months. The removal of a large number of banks from the PCA framework has increased credit flows in the commercial market and eased liquidity to the SME sector, signalling the revival of economic growth in the country.

Increased flow of liquidity in the economy is likely to uplift consumer demand on the back of an anticipation of normal monsoon, rise in MSP for major crops and fiscal boost to affordable housing in the Budget.

In a nutshell, volatility in the demand and supply side of financial markets presents a unique opportunity to NBFCs and HFCs to re-engineer their operations for FY20 and develop their franchise. The players who are quick to tap market sentiments and curate investor-friendly products will gain customer confidence and build new relationships to emerge triumphant.