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**GROWTH PRESCRIPTIONS**

# RBI initiatives can reverse slowdown in growth

The central bank's current monetary policy, having evolved from focusing solely on controlling inflation and emphasising independence, is aimed at supporting economic growth

**AN INTERVIEW** reported on July 22, 2019, Governor Shaktikanta Das was quoted as saying that the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was doing everything at its disposal to be in sync with the government's efforts to accelerate economic expansion, be it interest rate cuts, ensuring sufficient liquidity or enabling more bank lending.

From the time of Das's appointment as Governor, RBI in December 2018, there has been a noticeable change in RBI philosophy. Under the leadership of the two immediately previous governors, RBI had an unwavering focus only on controlling inflation and, emphasising its independence; it ignored other govern-

ment objectives, such as increasing economic growth or employment.

The objective of the Bank of England's monetary policy is to deliver price stability and, subject to that, to support the government's economic objectives, including those for growth and employment. The US Congress established the objectives for monetary policy by statute, the Federal Reserve Act, not leaving it to the independent thinking of the Fed—maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The Law of the People's Bank of China explicitly stipulates that the ultimate goal of China's monetary policy is to maintain currency stability,

and thereby facilitate economic growth—clearly, economic growth is the ultimate objective. The evolution of RBI's monetary policy objective from solely controlling inflation to supporting the government's objective of economic expansion is a refreshing and much-needed change.

RBI has sought to lower interest rates, but seems frustrated that there is a long lag between the time it lowers its repo rate—the rate at which banks can borrow from RBI in case of shortage of funds—and when the banks lower their lending rates. To speed up transmission, RBI should dramatically decrease the reverse repo rate—the rate earned by banks on deposits with RBI—so as to discourage banks from lazy banking. Public Sector Banks (PSBs) are blessed with huge inflows into savings and current accounts, notwithstanding their financial performance because of the customer perception of safety and trust that the Government of India is behind these PSBs; they get a decent return (5.15% even after the reduction on August 7) on such inflows without taking any risk by merely depositing them with RBI. Indeed, the reverse repo amounts totalled over ₹2 lakh crore at the end of the first week of August, up from ₹1 lakh crore in mid-July. This has occurred at a time when MSMEs, NBFCs, and potential borrowers are complaining of lack of availability of finance.

Since RBI has expressed its intention to enable more bank lending, reducing the reverse repo rate to a level where it is no longer attractive for banks to put deposits with RBI is a desirable and necessary step. One-third of sovereign bonds globally carry a negative rate of return, i.e., investors will get back less than what they paid at the time of issue, paying a price for safekeeping of their funds. Banks must likewise pay a price if they want the safety of depositing funds with RBI; otherwise, the banks must play their role as intermediaries between savers and borrowers, and seek out borrowers. The private sector banks have shown that there is no dearth of such customers at this time. If the reduction in deposit rates leads to a reduction in deposit rates, it is only fair given the low-inflation scenario prevailing currently; the government must then act with alacrity to reduce administered interest rates, such as the unconscionable tax-free rate of return on prov-

**Too much was being made of the "independence" of RBI in the recent past. No one ever advocated reducing RBI's role in controlling money supply.**

ident funds and small deposit schemes. The US Fed, Bank of England, Bank of Japan have been forward-looking in employing the tools of monetary policy at their disposal. In developing its monetary policy, Bank of Japan employs the Tankan survey, a quarterly poll of thousands of companies that have linkages with economic conditions. The companies are asked about current trends and conditions in the business place and their respective industries as well as their expected business activities for the next quarter and year. For example, firms are asked about domestic demand and supply, inventory levels, projections for inflation, and the number of new graduates they hired in the last year. A rear-view mirror of "hard data", which comes with a lag, results in dated inputs for monetary policy decisions. RBI must develop an efficient system of assessing every quarter forward-looking economic sentiments of rural and urban consumers and businesses as inputs for its monetary initiatives.

In the developed world, monetary policy is proactive and fiscal policy lags in response to developing economic situations. In India, monetary policy has hitherto been reactive while fiscal initiatives are more proactive—for instance, RBI, in its Monthly Monetary Policy Statement 2015-16, dated August 4, 2015, acknowledged the "Government's current proactive supply management to contain shocks to food prices, especially of vegetables, alongside its decision to keep increases in minimum support prices moderate"; the central government is trying to pace out capital expenditure evenly over the fiscal year instead of having it bunched towards the end, as was the practice in earlier times. Where the central government has miserably failed is in its own objective of ease of doing business, and in gross inefficiency in administration—witness the initiatives of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, such as striking off companies which only hurts lakhs of innocent employees, directors and creditors while protecting the crooked cronies from tax claims, the poor implementation of the GST and the IBC, the tax initiatives introduced without homework, such as the tax on FPIs. If the central government wishes to slow down the slide in the economy and improve the growth rate, it must recognise that the enemy is within—and it is the bureaucracy.

RBI can also play its part in ease of doing business—for instance, avoiding classifying bank accounts as "dormant or inactive", which entails hassles for small depositors, avoiding paperwork for foreign receipts and payments, which even exporters have to comply with, removing the requirement of filling a KYC repeatedly for a bank customer transferring amounts to mutual funds or opening broker accounts or demat accounts, encouraging speedy adoption of technology to serve customers better.

Too much was being made of the "independence" of RBI in the recent past. No one ever advocated reducing RBI's role in controlling money supply. Monetary policy objectives must be dovetailed with fiscal policy objectives, and Governor Shaktikanta Das' endorsement of this is a refreshing recent change at RBI. Along with economic growth, RBI may explicitly aim to facilitate employment, and less explicitly, to prevent currency volatility; work with SEBI and others to facilitate foreign inflows to augment foreign exchange reserves, and to reduce the onerous form-filling requirements, thereby facilitating the less-financial to put financial savings into financial instruments rather than land or gold; develop a framework in association with SEBI and the government for managing the possible systemic risk from large finance companies and from debt mutual funds, which do not enjoy lender-of-the-last-resort support or an inter-institutional market like the inter-bank market.

## COMMODITY MARKETS 'PAC'king quite a few benefits

**KUSHANKUR DEY**

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Product Advisory Committee will deepen benefits of derivatives markets

**S**ETTING UP AN independent Product Advisory Committee (PAC) to deepen the benefits of commodity derivative markets to commodity value chain actors is a timely move by Sebi. It will address issues in the contract design of commodities and cater to needs of physical market participants. Based on Commodity Derivatives Advisory Committee's (CADAC) advice, Sebi has directed each recognised exchange, including stock and commodity, to "constitute a PAC for each group/complex of commodities having common stakeholders/value chain participants, on which derivatives are traded or being proposed to be traded". This requires PAC to:

- work on contract design for new commodities, explore a right mix of liquid and hedge contracts, review design of existing contracts, and ensure these are as per industry's needs;
- work on aligning quality/grade and quantity specifications of the product with spot/physical ready-cash markets;
- provide a choice-set of basis variety, propose additional delivery centres which are exchange-accredited warehouses, and review existing delivery centres;
- review performance of existing contracts on various explicit and broad-based parameters;
- discuss the strategies for the commodity during meetings or at least twice a year

But, how will PAC extend benefits of futures to the value chain stakeholders? Will it effectively address the state of the market for commodities under the chairmanship of independent advisor—devoid of any principal and agent dichotomy?

Performance review of existing futures/options contracts, changing the contract design, and exploration of opportunities for new contract could be an up-hill task.

Fundamental factors of commodities should be studied by assessing the local demand and supply. Stock-to-use ratio is essential from the local demand viewpoint of futures/options contract. In the case of *guar gum*, a derivative of *guar* seed, the stock-to-use ratio of the seed determines the liquidity position, price and spread of gum contracts. Also, convenience yield benefits to commodity-holder should be appraised before PAC decides frequency of contract, delivery and stack and roll hedging.

Identifying close substitutes or rival contracts can help explore avenues for inter- or intra-commodity spread and/or calendar spread. Selection of basis variety and tenderable varieties for futures/options contract, too, is important, to encourage and sustain participation of physical market actors.

Delivery schedule should mirror the agricultural cycle of the produce while spot price could be depressed. So, in presence of liquid and efficiency futures/options, producers can offload risk, to secure income and stimulate investment in agriculture.

Market micro-structure parameters—bid-ask spread, margining, contract size, contract duration, price band, etc.—are critical to assess performance of futures/options contract. A research body aligned with PAC should review historical and stochastic performance of competing/completing contracts.

PAC's expected role, is at both the micro and meso-levels. At the micro-level, PAC can observe heterogeneity in participation between physical and derivative market actors, helping exchanges and regulators take measures to bring parity in trade and maintain a healthy hedger-to-speculator ratio. At the meso level, it can help internalise the altruistic benefits of commodity derivative markets among market participants. The advisory body can contribute to the commodity/stock exchange utility and management in reliable price discovery, price dissemination, and effective hedging against basis risk. PAC, in its review meeting, should disclose hedger-to-speculator ratio, to help discover optimal number of derivative contracts (liquid) for each group of commodities and rationalise transaction fees.

The membership criteria and rating system for FPOs should be revised in view of financialisation of commodities. PAC and Regulatory Oversight Committee, in consultation with CADAC, should enable trading, settlement, and delivery. Exchange of futures for physicals/alternate settlement mechanism should be promoted along with early pay-in facility.

PAC should facilitate index trading to access annualised average yield and volatility from the disclosure of commodity exchange. In FY19, the average yield at N-Krishi of NCDEX and MCX-Comdex was 6.6% and 12.5%, respectively, while their volatilities varied from 19% to 37.4%. It should adopt good governance practices from international exchanges and regulators. The committee's right intention, autonomy, directed effort in facilitating and designing broad-based contracts can help accommodate a diverse group of commodity stakeholders—from producers and processors to traders.

## CENTRAL BANK ALCHEMY

# Converting reserves into money

Financing budget expenditure through RBI surpluses is novel financial engineering

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₹2.2-2.3 lakh crore and is supposed to be used in case of revaluation of securities held by RBI. With yields coming down, the value of securities would go up and so would these funds, becoming one potential source of funds. The other is currency revaluation—quite high at ₹6.91 lakh crore. If the rupee declines, the fixed set of dollars would be valued higher in rupee terms on the assets side, increasing the reserves on the liabilities side. However, if the rupee appreciates, as is the case today, the reverse would occur and the rupee value of reserves will come down.

Hence, one is really looking at these ₹10 lakh crore of reserves, a part of which can be potentially monetised by RBI and passed on

to the government. Since this is legally permitted, there can be no questions in this regard. Some of the questions that the Committee will address are the following.

First, what is the quantum of reserves that can be monetised and drawn out of the balance sheet? Is the contingency fund adequate or too high. However, if we go back another five years, a level of ₹1.5 lakh crore was also witnessed in 2009. Therefore, depending on how far back the Committee looks, there is still potential to draw down this reserve on the grounds that one could manage with a lower amount, as there has not been an instance when the level dipped sharply. Prima facie, keeping a limit of ₹2



lakh crore could be a safe level that releases ₹0.3 lakh crore.

The currency revaluation reserve has been more volatile—₹5.3-6.9 lakh crore in the last five years, with the lower end being reached in 2017 and a low of ₹1.2 lakh crore in 2010. Here, the Committee can think of lowering the reserves by a considerable amount—by, say, around ₹1.5-2 lakh crore—and keeping 15 lakh crore as the floor. Overall, around ₹2-2.2 lakh crore can be drawn from these two reserves.

The second question which follows is that if reserves were to be lowered, how would adjustment be made to the assets side of the balance sheet? If the liabilities get

reduced by, say, ₹2 lakh crore, the assets, too, should be lowered. This will be interesting, because if the currency revaluation reserve is reduced, it means that some part of the forex should drop out of the system. RBI has been buying forex from banks to supply liquidity and, hence, any drawdown of forex will mean selling the same to banks, which will create a liquidity problem. Therefore, it is more likely that the dollars have to be kept in a separate suspense account to balance the accounts. Even if the contingency reserve is reduced, it could mean lowering the impact of GSecs (through OMOs), which will stock liquidity in the system as well as GSec yields. This, too, may have to be held in a different account, much like the MSS bonds. The Committee's call on this aspect is something that will be awaited.

The third question is whether the transfer will be done in one stroke or over a period of time. The indication is that it will be done over a period of three to five years, which, being more manageable, has the advantage of reducing market volatility. A one-shot transfer can mean a major shock for the financial market because if ₹2 lakh crore is taken out from, say, the currency revaluation account, the shock for the forex market can be a matter of conjecture. Alternatively, if the contingency fund is being lowered, a call has to be taken on RBI's GSec holdings, which can create disturbances in bond yields. This is something RBI has to consider finally.

Fourth, would the transfer of funds would be conditional or not? Economists would argue that if the RBI reserves are used for financing the budget and are treated as a revenue/capital receipt, depending on how the Committee sees it, it would resemble the disinvestment receipts that are used for general expenses. On the other hand, if they are earmarked for, say, bank capitalisation or specific infra projects, it would be targeted and easier to accept. Unlike disinvestment, which can spread over decades as the government can potentially sell stake in various entities, in this case, it would be almost limited by the target amount decided by the Committee. This is so because the recent experience has been that all RBI annual surpluses are transferred to the government as non-tax revenue. Hence, scope of these reserves increasing may be limited. This will subsume the concept of a macro norm being applied on the desirability of reserves and surpluses in relation to the balance sheet size, which can be 15% or 20%.

Using RBI surplus reserves for financing the budget expenditure is definitely novel—more akin to recap bonds that finances expenses through a different financial engineering. With fiscal pressures mounting, it is natural that new sources of finance are explored as traction in tax revenue is always uncertain. Sale of assets, like land or property, can be the next frontier, and the Railways could open up space for discussion.