



## In the right direction

The DTC task force recommendations will reduce litigation

The task force on the Direct Tax Code (DTC) submitted its report to Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman on Monday. The government has not yet given any timeframe for releasing the report (it should put it in the public domain soon to enable an informed debate), but some of the recommendations have been reported, including by this newspaper, and are in the right direction. For instance, the report has proposed changes in personal tax slabs to benefit the middle and upper-middle class Indians, though the extent of the reduction and the status of exemptions are not clear. Further, the panel has reportedly recommended reducing the corporate tax rate to 25 per cent for both domestic and foreign companies. Over 99 per cent of domestic firms are already at this level and the rate is likely to be reduced for the rest in the coming years. Therefore, there should not be any difficulty in accepting this recommendation. The reduction in the tax rate for foreign firms will help bring more investment and boost growth in the medium to long run. Some of the foreign firms may, however, wait for the fine print as the panel has proposed a branch profits tax on the amount repatriated to their foreign partners.

However, the most significant suggestions are in the area of tax disputes. The task force has suggested replacing assessing officers with assessment units. This is in addition to the idea of faceless scrutiny of cases picked centrally and allocated randomly. Also, taxpayers may be allowed to go for negotiated settlement through a collegium of commissioners. This will help reduce cases of harassment by tax officials and make life easier for taxpayers. Further, the report has recommended changing the rules for reopening assessment cases. It should be done on the basis of pre-defined criteria. All this will help reduce litigation and is likely to aid both the government and taxpayers. Currently, there are tax-related disputes worth about ₹6 trillion. It is no secret that the Income-Tax Department is the largest tax litigant, and the success rate is pretty low. Often, arbitrary or irrational demands are raised by assessing officers, because they must meet unrealistic targets, on which hinges their performance appraisal. This results in the taxpayer invariably filing an appeal. So any step to reduce litigation must be welcomed.

Overall, the task force has made all the right noises. Fundamentally, there is no dispute that tax rates need to be brought down for both individuals and firms. However, what would perhaps be worth debating at this stage is whether the current fiscal situation will allow the government to move in this direction. In order to make a significant difference, the tax department would need to work on compliance. Irrespective of what the government decides to do with the recommendations of the task force, the tax department should build capabilities through better use of technology to check evasion. It is important to bring more people in the tax net to increase revenue. At the broader level, the task force has given an opportunity to the government to rewrite direct tax laws, and it should aim to reduce rates, broaden the tax base, remove distortions in the system, and contain the possibility of disputes.

## Population and patriotism

Birth rates are influenced by overall development

Speaking from the ramparts of the Red Fort on Independence Day, Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi equated population control and patriotism: “Population explosion will cause many problems for our future generations. But there is a vigilant section of public (who) ... have a small family and express their patriotism to the country. Let’s learn from them.” The PM is not wrong that India’s large population has stressed its infrastructure, its natural resources, and its administrative and educational capacity. But, in a sense, the population problem is yesterday’s problem. While the population will continue to grow, it is not an increasing problem. Indeed, according to the United Nations’ population division projections, the number of Indians under the age of five peaked in 2007. The number under 15 peaked in 2011 and is now falling. The current generation of under-25 years will be India’s largest ever — its demographic “bulge”. India’s own figures on the total fertility rate, or TFR, from the Sample Registration System of the Office of the Registrar General of India back up this slowing of births. The nationwide TFR has steadily declined from 3.24 in 2001 to 2.53 in 2011 to an estimated 2.2 now, and will be lower by 2021. The larger part of future population growth, therefore, is going to be on account of increased longevity and the growth of the 60+ age group as a result of better health, nutrition, and care. This is, of course, a desirable outcome.

This overall improvement conceals considerable geographic and social diversity. In many parts of India, such as the South Indian states, Kashmir, and West Bengal, the TFR is particularly low — at European levels or below, in fact. Many minority communities, such as Christians, Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains, have their TFR below the replacement level of 2.1. But areas like Uttar Pradesh (with a TFR of 3), Bihar (a TFR of 3.2), and other parts of the Hindi heartland continue to see significantly high birth rates. Thus, if the PM is serious about managing the population increase, these are the areas that should be targeted. In other words, the challenge is development; population control is a derived benefit. The lessons of India’s past experience with family planning should be taken on board. Behavioural change comes about as a product of external stimuli. The most important factors are increased urbanisation, access to income security, lower infant and child mortality rates, improved public health standards, occupational patterns, and so on. Female empowerment, including the number of women working and the effectiveness of female education, may have an even greater role to play.

Linking the issue of birth rates to patriotism is a wrong way to look at the problem. Most differences, including between communities and regions, can be best explained through other development indicators. Any policy framed as a result should take these facts into account. The government might want to consider giving incentives to those with two children or fewer. However, the fiscal situation at the moment is far from being comfortable, and there are many other calls on the government’s purse — so new items of expenditure to address this problem might be unwise. The focus should be on extending health care, expanding urbanisation, and female empowerment in left-behind areas.



## GDP measurement and the slowdown

Although there are some structural issues, the economy is slowing largely due to cyclical factors

Arvind Subramanian’s view that India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was over-estimated after the 2011-12 base revision is being used incorrectly to argue the slowdown is likely to be recalcitrant and worse than it appears. Subramanian’s empirical results cover the period 2011-2016 and have been subject to widespread criticism to which there is no satisfactory response. We show his recent heuristic arguments to be equally unsatisfactory. Therefore, they cannot illuminate the recent period. The National Accounts Statistics (NAS) data shows a slowdown now and showed a slowdown continually in investment and exports, which was earlier countered by credit-fuelled consumption.

In a rejoinder paper, Subramanian de-emphasises his estimations, choosing to focus on puzzles such as Indian growth rates remaining high despite a number of shocks and a fall in exports and investment growth, in an attempt to recreate Indian growth rates from the demand side.

It is true that export growth declined significantly. But domestic consumption and service growth was high and could have compensated. He does not come to grips with the fact that India had an unusual service-led growth since the reform in the 1990s. A large diversified economy has more ability to absorb shocks compared to small export-dependent economies. If one sector slows, another expands.

Demand components were underestimating GDP even before 2011 and, therefore, cannot be used to link underestimation to measurement changes. Demand-side estimates, based more on benchmarks and thumb rules, are not robust compared to production-based estimates. Even taking demand side, the NAS estimates tell a consistent story. Investment declined from about 34 per cent

to 29-30 per cent of GDP, as clearly shown in the official estimates. Underutilised capacity as well as improvements in productivity allowed consumption-led growth that arrested any significant growth decline till 2017-18. Recent slowdown in consumption credit due to problems in the non-banking financial companies (NBFCs), as well as election-related postponement in private investment and few structural issues, explain the decline in growth to 5.8 per cent in the last quarter of 2018-19.

Subramanian argues the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) consumer confidence survey shows a fall in confidence, so growth could not have been consumption-led. Moreover, credit slowed. But credit fell to manufacturing not to services. There was a rise in retail credit as private banks and NBFCs competed to lend to consumers, financing a consumption boom. Consumption credit growth was high until the IL&FS crisis. Household liabilities rose consistently. Their gross domestic savings fell from about 23 per cent to 19 per cent of GDP. The aggregate credit data he uses cannot capture these compositional changes.

Increasing use of technology has raised productivity. It is possible that outdated methodologies were underestimating growth rates before 2011—changes may be capturing value added, quality and productivity improvements. Intellectuals sometimes get wedded to concepts and ideas of underdevelopment they are unwilling to shed.

Subramanian argues there could not have been growth in productivity because corporate sector profits declined. But this result is restricted to a corporate database where he does not specify the number of firms. National Sample Survey (NSS) in 2017 showed the unorganised sector’s compound annual productivity growth at 7.2 per cent over 2011-



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## A wake-up call for DoT

The telecom sector has been in crisis for quite some time. The warning signs have been clear as daylight: Exit of the smaller firms, RCom going into bankruptcy, huge losses of incumbent firms, mounting debt and stressed bank assets. The government’s insouciance and inaction defies all logic.

Consider the industry-level facts. Revenues normally grew at a steady clip of 5-9 per cent per annum. In the past four years, however, the industry’s revenues fell by 20 per cent. The telcos debt (excluding the tower business) has tripled and is now a whopping ₹4.3 trillion. The debt is now 2.6 times its annual revenues. Government revenues (licence and spectrum usage fees) have fallen by 36 per cent.

Disaggregating, look at the private sector. Tata Teleservices, RCom, Aircel, Telenor and Videocon have exited. Debt has nearly quadrupled in four years, increasing by ₹2.8 trillion. Idea-Voda and Jio each have debt of ₹1.5 trillion. In 2018-19, the debt was thrice the annual revenues. Two of the majors have reported losses for the past three years. In 2015-16, when debt levels were relatively low, the EBITDA margin for the three majors was 34 per cent. In 2018-19, this margin had collapsed to 25 per cent; for one firm it was barely 13 per cent.

The public sector picture is even bleaker. In the last four years, BSNL’s revenues have fallen by 40 per cent and MTNL’s by 30 per cent. BSNL and MTNL have reported operational losses continuously since 2013-14. In 2018-19, BSNL’s losses are more than ₹14,000 crore; cumulative losses exceed ₹0.9 trillion. MTNL’s losses are greater than its revenues and its debt is nine times its revenues. Except for hand-wringing, the government has done scant little.

Some distress was inexorable. A shakeout was necessary — there were far too many firms. Exit and bankruptcy were the only options. Further, Jio’s entry had to be disruptive — it was the only

way it could succeed. Zero price became its USP. The resultant price war wreaked havoc on the finances.

But, it was not a level playing field. Regulatory action became the new invisible hand determining economic fortunes. The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai) turned a blind eye and let the zero price regime go on and on. Its questionable order on termination charges reduced Jio’s payout (costs) and reduced its rivals’ revenues (*Business Standard*, September 2017). Then came Trai’s egregious order on predatory pricing: Jio was free to price below cost because it could not be a predator and all others were potential predators because they had market share. This order had other odious and anti-competitive provisions (*Business Standard*, 16 March 2018).

The Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) set aside provisions of the order 18 months later. By that time, the damage was done. The secretary in the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) who drew attention to the falling industry and government revenues was peremptorily transferred.

The severe financial stress raises the spectre of more NPAs for public sector banks. More importantly, it raises questions of long-term commercial viability. Do the math. If the debt-to-revenue ratio is 2.5, then with 8 per cent as the cost of debt, 20 per cent of revenues are required just to service the debt. Then add on the amortisation for spectrum and depreciation (as replacement cost). For two firms where data is available, depreciation and amortisation are, respectively, 20 per cent and 11 per cent of revenues. Even if the latter are judged too high, at today’s debt levels, the minimum EBITDA margin to survive is 40 to 45 per cent.

The industry is capital-intensive but its defining characteristic is rapid technological obsolescence. The 3G spectrum auction was held in 2010. 3G systems became operational in 2012 (some later). In

2016 exceeded that of the organised sector (3.2 per cent). Demonetisation impacts fall outside the Subramanian estimation period.

Corporate distress in India was narrow, restricted to a few firms largely in infrastructure. That private corporate savings and investments increased from 9.5 per cent to 12.1 per cent and 11.2 per cent to 12.3 per cent of GDP, respectively, over 2011-16 shows diversity in corporate outcomes.

The two possible reasons Subramanian identifies for over-estimation are: (1) use of MCA21 data for industry and (2) absence of double deflation in a period when there was considerable dispersion between different price indices. But issues highlighted are of doubtful validity and also transient. No one has so far showed problems in the MCA data (only the Central Statistics Office has worked on it) except for saying its growth rates are higher than from Annual Survey of Industries and Index of Industrial Production (IIP). Until this is done, underestimation may be as likely as overestimation—there are grounds for both. The database has matured and become more robust based on 3,00,000 active firms. Dummy firms are cleaned out. As divergence between indices dropped sharply in 2017, measured growth should have fallen if deflation was a major cause of overestimation. But growth rose. Double deflation is itself not well-established.

The shift to the enterprise from the establishment approach, which now includes a number of headquarter services, partly explains higher CSO manufacturing growth compared to that from the IIP. Moreover, CSO captures values compared to volume in IIP.

Finally, the NAS data is massive. The CSO uses around 3,000 data sources and more than 300 surveys. No regressions or correlations can substitute it. There are several continuing problems like old benchmarks, informal sector data etc. But, this cannot be used to criticise revision, which is an improvement in these respects. For example, the NSS 2011-12 informal enterprise survey is better than the 2006-07 one used earlier.

The more heuristic arguments Subramanian makes now are, therefore, not more convincing than his empirical estimates.

The present slowdown shows up in the data to its true extent. It is largely due to cyclical factors, although there are some structural issues. Countercyclical policies can be quickly implemented in several sectors to enhance demand, growth and jobs without waiting for structural reforms. Monetary policy can reduce the interest rates further as real rates are still high; abundant liquidity aids transmission. The government can frontload planned expenditure and rebuild confidence.

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## Kashmir from the ground up



### BOOK REVIEW

CHINTAN GIRISH MODI

Come from a place where funerals of the young are political events, mourning is permanent politics, and the people are in a constant battle between memory and forgetfulness,” writes Gowhar Geelani, whose book, *Kashmir: Rage and Reason*, is a reality check for Indians who think peace can come to the valley via curfews and communication clampdowns, and the promise of economic growth can magically erase the evidence of bloodshed.

Self-determination is too precious a dream to give up, so those who make it their vocation are celebrated as heroes. Kashmir is a place where tombstones of slain militants are like shrines, and people venerate them so much that a visit to the martyrs’ graves is considered no less than a pilgrimage.

The book takes off from the encounter killing of Burhan Wani, a young man who is a martyr to most Kashmiris but a terrorist in the eyes of the Indian state. Why did the son of a school principal join the Hizbul Mujahideen, and become a militant? Why did people from all over Kashmir put their lives in jeopardy, and walk several miles for his funeral? This is the story Mr Geelani wants to tell. It is the story of not just one individual but of Kashmir itself — a flashpoint of conflict between two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, that seem to care more about

the land than the people.

Mr Geelani does not valorise or discredit armed resistance. He keeps his ear to the ground, writes about his impressions of the situation, and interprets it for readers who are outsiders looking in. As a journalist and political commentator, he has documented the history of political resistance in Kashmir, and its changing contours over several years. “The reason why people continue to support local militants is because most Kashmiris feel oppressed, dispossessed and disempowered on multiple fronts, as spaces for democratic dissent stand choked in the restive region. There is a ban on peaceful assembly, and student politics in universities is not allowed either,” he says.

Mr Geelani is based in Srinagar, a city where he grew up in the early 1990s and

personally experienced what it felt like to be seething with rage when armed personnel frisked schoolchildren, forced them to prove their identity in their own land, threw their school bags away, and hurled abusive words at them. Recalling that time, he writes, “Young men in their thousands had crossed the LoC to receive arms training in camps run by the Pakistani Army and its spy wing, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). I was too young to take such a life-turning decision then, of fighting the State with a gun in my hand. All my hands could handle well were a cricket ball and bat, as an off-spinning all-rounder, and a pen, which I hoped to put to good use in the years to come.”

Mr Geelani writes about the political aspirations of his own people. This is a position of great responsibility. He does not collapse various shades and extremes of opinion but engages with them carefully, unveiling layers to which non-Kashmiris may find difficult to

relate in the absence of local knowledge about the social ecosystem in which resistance plays itself out. He notes the prevalence of pro-Pakistan sentiment in the valley but also points out how Pakistan has appropriated the Kashmiri independence struggle by sending in Islamist militants, thus inviting speculation about possible links with Daesh. He laments the hardships faced by Kashmiri Pandits who had to seek refuge in camps in Jammu and elsewhere.

“The problem is that very few Pandits or Muslims acknowledge the pain and suffering the other has endured...Voices that have dared to rise above ideological and religious differences to acknowledge pain as pain, without making any attempt to quantify or reduce it to a mere number game, are rare,” he writes. He has little faith in the leadership of the Abdullahs and Muftis but that does not diminish his hopes for Kashmir. “Can Srinagar become a bridge of friendship between Islamabad and Delhi, and not a bone of

contention? Can someone make it happen, instead of waiting for things to happen? Who will extend the hand of friendship? Who will reciprocate? Will Srinagar produce such a statesman?”

This book was published before the abrogation of Article 370. As restrictions on movement are relaxed, and phone lines are restored, more Kashmiri voices will be heard. What forms of resistance might emerge to meet the demands of the present moment? What kinds of solidarities might shape up across movements? What role will the Kashmiri diaspora play? The answers could take a while to come, and perhaps the next edition of Mr Geelani’s book will give readers more to chew on.

**KASHMIR: Rage And Reason**

Gowhar Geelani

Rupa, 288 pages, ₹395

The writer is former chairman of Trai