



Knee-jerk

Pakistan must reconsider its decision to downgrade diplomatic ties with India

Pakistan's decision to expel India's High Commissioner, snap trade relations and observe August 15 as a black day in supposed solidarity with the people of Jammu & Kashmir is a serious setback for diplomatic relations. Wednesday's announcements appear to be a knee-jerk reaction to the mounting pressures on the Pakistani establishment to respond to India's executive-legislative actions that whittle down Article 370. Pakistan has consistently described chief ministers of Jammu & Kashmir as "puppets" and never recognised the legitimacy of the government in Srinagar. Its sudden concerns about India's actions in its own territory are reflective of muddled confusion. Ironically, this is the first time Islamabad has articulated that Article 370 was aligned with the interests of the Kashmiri people. Every Pakistani government and the country's permanent establishment have continued to peddle the myth that they could unilaterally alter the status quo in J&K. Now, they feel compelled to respond to the expectations that they have themselves raised in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Sections of Indian civil society have legitimate concerns about the actions of the BJP Government in emptying out Article 370 and the continuing lockdown of the Valley, but this does not license Pakistan to interfere in what the MEA correctly described on Thursday as India's internal matter.

In the days to come, India can expect Pakistan to raise the Kashmir issue at the United Nations, mobilise the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and send envoys to friendly capitals. India is well placed to deal with Pakistan on the diplomatic front given the changed international context. India's economic clout has grown enormously in the last couple of decades, and given doubts in the Western world about Pakistan's overt and covert support to Islamist terror, New Delhi has the space to deal with Islamabad's efforts to "internationalise" the Kashmir issue. Downgrading diplomatic relations between troubled neighbours is never a good idea. Neither is snapping trade and transport links. India withdrew its High Commissioner to Pakistan after the 2001 Parliament attack, but chose not to send back the Pakistani envoy at the time. However, the Pakistani High Commissioner was expelled by India after the Kaluchak terror strike in 2002. It's interesting to note that despite all the troubles the two countries have had, High Commissioners have been able to return to their jobs since full diplomatic relations were restored in 1976. In fact, even after the 2001 Parliament attack, India and Pakistan managed to have their High Commissioners back in place by March 2003. Diplomacy is a mechanism to ensure that channels of communication remain open. While India and Pakistan have used back channels in recent years, the presence of seasoned diplomats in Delhi and Islamabad has always benefited the two countries. Pakistan needs to comprehend this.

Cycle of extremes

India must address its crippling cycles of drought and flood with redoubled vigour

After a worrying pre-monsoon phase between March and May, when rainfall was scarce, the current robust season in most parts of coastal, western and central India augurs well for the entire economy. Aided apparently by beneficial conditions in the Indian Ocean, very heavy rainfall has been recorded, notably in Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, the north-eastern States, Karnataka, the Konkan coast, hilly districts of Kerala and Tamil Nadu. This pattern may extend into the eastern regions. A normal Indian Summer Monsoon is bountiful overall, but as last year's flooding in Kerala, and the Chennai catastrophe of 2015 showed, there can be a terrible cost. Distressing scenes of death and destruction are again being witnessed. Even in a rain-shadow region such as Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu, the collapse of a railway parcel office after a downpour has led to avoidable deaths. What this underscores is the need to prepare for the rainy season with harvesting measures, as advocated by the Jal Shakti Abhiyan, and a safety audit of structures, particularly those used by the official agencies. In drafting their management plans, States must be aware of the scientific consensus: that future rain spells may be short, often unpredictable and very heavy, influenced by a changing climate. They need to invest in reliable infrastructure to mitigate the impact of flooding and avert disasters that could have global consequences in an integrated economy.

The long-term trends for flood impact in India have been one of declining loss of lives and cattle since the decadal high of 1971-80, but rising absolute economic losses, though not as a share of GDP. It is important, therefore, to increase urban resilience through planning. Orderly urban development is critical for sustainability, as the mega flood disasters in Mumbai and Chennai make clear. It is worth pointing out that the response of State governments to the imperative is tardy. They are hesitant to act against encroachment of lake catchments, river courses and floodplains. The extreme distress in Chennai, for instance, has not persuaded the State government against allowing structures such as a police station being constructed on a lake bed, after reclassification of land. Granting such permissions is an abdication of responsibility and a violation of National Disaster Management Authority Guidelines to prevent urban flooding. As a nation that is set to become the most populous in less than a decade, India must address its crippling cycles of drought and flood with redoubled vigour. Scientific hydrology, coupled with the traditional wisdom of saving water through large innovative structures, will mitigate floods and help communities prosper.

Economic milestone and a poignant anniversary

Bank nationalisation eased rural credit and aided financial inclusion. Any move to reverse it would be self-defeating



R. RAMAKUMAR

The nationalisation of banks in 1969 was a watershed moment in the history of Indian banking. From July 19 that year, 14 private banks were nationalised; another six private banks were nationalised in 1980. It is certain that one cannot locate a similar transformational moment in the banking policy of any country at any point of time in history.

At the time of Independence, India's rural financial system was marked by the domination of landlords, traders and moneylenders. In 1951, if a rural household had an outstanding debt of ₹100, about ₹93 came from non-institutional sources. From the 1950s, there were sporadic efforts to expand the reach of the institutional sector, particularly in the rural areas. Despite these measures, the predominantly private banking system failed to meet the credit needs of the rural areas.

Class to mass banking

India's banking policy after 1969 followed a multi-agency approach towards expanding the geographical spread and functional reach of the formal banking system. First, as a part of a new branch licensing policy, banks were told that for every branch they opened in a metropolitan or port area, four new branches had to be opened in unbanked rural areas. As a result, the number of rural bank branches increased from 1,833 (in 1969) to 35,206 (in 1991). Second, the concept of priority-sector lending was introduced. All banks had to compulsorily set aside 40% of their net

bank credit for agriculture, micro and small enterprises, housing, education and "weaker" sections. Third, a differential interest rate scheme was introduced in 1974. Here, loans were provided at a low interest rate to the weakest among the weakest sections of the society.

Fourth, the Lead Bank scheme was introduced in 1969. Each district was assigned to one bank, where they acted as "pace-setters" in providing integrated banking facilities. Fifth, the Regional Rural Banks (RRB) were established in 1975 to enlarge the supply of institutional credit to the rural areas. Sixth, the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) was constituted in 1982 to regulate and supervise the functions of cooperative banks and RRBs.

The outcomes of such a multi-agency approach were admirable. The share of institutional sources in the outstanding debt of rural households increased from just 16.9% in 1962 to 64% in 1992.

Growth spurring

India's nationalisation experience is an answer to mainstream economists who argue that administered interest rates cause "financial repression". According to this view, if the government administers interest rates, the savings rate would decline, leading to a rationing of investment funds. On the contrary, India's nationalisation led to an impressive growth of financial intermediation. The share of bank deposits to GDP rose from 13% in 1969 to 38% in 1991. The gross savings rate rose from 12.8% in 1969 to 21.7% in 1990. The share of advances to GDP rose from 10% in 1969 to 25% in 1991. The gross investment rate rose from 13.9% in 1969 to 24.1% in 1990.

Nationalisation also demonstrated the utility of monetary pol-



A.M. FARUQUE

icy in furthering redistributionist goals. Some economists argue that banks cannot be used to right "historical wrongs". On the other hand, India's nationalisation shows that monetary policy, banks and interest rates can be effectively used to take banks to rural areas, backward regions and under-served sectors, furthering redistributionist goals in an economy.

A retreat

Yet, strangely, arguments in favour of financial liberalisation after 1991 were based on the theory of financial repression. The Narasimham Committee of 1991 recommended that monetary policy should be divorced from redistributionist goals. Instead, banks should be free to practise commercial modes of operation, with profitability as the primary goal.

Taking the cue, the Reserve Bank of India allowed banks to open and close branches as they desired. Priority sector guidelines were diluted; banks were allowed to lend to activities that were remotely connected with agriculture or to big corporates in agri-business, yet classify them as agricultural loans. Interest rate regulations on priority sector advances were removed.

The outcomes were immediately visible. More than 900 rural bank branches closed down across the country. The rate of growth of agricultural credit fell sharply from around 7% per annum in the

1980s to about 2% per annum in the 1990s. This retreat of public banks wreaked havoc on the rural financial market. Between 1991 and 2002, the share of institutional sources in the total outstanding debt of rural households fell from 64% to 57.1%. The space vacated by institutional sources was promptly occupied by moneylenders and other non-institutional sources.

A to and fro

The government and the RBI probably saw the danger coming. In 2004, a policy to double the flow of agricultural credit within three years was announced. Only public banks could make this happen. So, in 2005, the RBI quietly brought in a new branch authorisation policy. Permission for new branches began to be given only if the RBI was satisfied that the banks concerned had a plan to adequately serve underbanked areas and ensure actual credit flow to agriculture. By 2011, the RBI further tightened this procedure. It was mandated that at least 25% of new branches were to be compulsorily located in unbanked centres.

As a result, the number of rural bank branches rose from 30,646 in 2005, to 33,967 in 2011 and 48,536 in 2015. The annual growth rate of real agricultural credit rose from about 2% in the 1990s to about 18% between 2001 and 2015. Much of this new provision of agricultural credit did not go to farmers; it largely went to big agri-business firms and corporate houses located in urban and metropolitan centres – but recorded in the bank books as "agricultural credit". For this reason, the share of institutional credit in the debt outstanding of rural households in 2013 stood at 56%, still lower than the levels of 1991 and 2002. Yet, in achieving the high growth of credit provision, the expansion of public bank branches was pivotal.

After 2005, public banks also played a central role in furthering the financial inclusion agendas of successive governments. Between 2010 and 2016, the key responsibility of opening no-frills accounts for the unbanked poor fell upon public banks. Data show that more than 90% of the new no-frills accounts were opened in public banks. Most of these accounts lie dormant or inactive, but it is unmistakable that the fulfilling of the goal required the decisive presence and intervention of public banks. The same public banks were also India's vanguard during the global financial crisis of 2007 when most markets in the developed world, dominated by private banks, collapsed.

However, despite such a stellar track record, the macroeconomic policy framework of successive governments has hardly been supportive of a banking structure dominated by public banks. In times of slow growth, the excess liquidity in banks was seen as a substitute for counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Successive governments, scared of higher fiscal deficits, encouraged public banks to lend more for retail and personal loans, high-risk infrastructural sectors and vehicle loans. Here, banks funded by short-term deposit liabilities were taking on exposures that involved long-term risks, often not backed by due diligence. Unsurprisingly, many loans turned sour. Consequently, banks are in crisis with rising non-performing assets. The same fear of fiscal deficits is also scaring the government away from recapitalising banks. The solution put forward is a perverse one: privatisation. The goose that lays golden eggs is being killed.

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A leaf out of the Chinese playbook

India's actions in Kashmir increasingly show an authoritarian muscularity, reminiscent of its northern neighbour



PALLAVI AIYAR

It has been possible to argue that comparing Asia's two largest countries, China and India, is akin to holding up an apple to an orange. This is not because the challenges facing them are so very different. Neither China's authoritarian polity, nor India's democratic one have prevented large-scale corruption, environmental degradation, yawning inequalities or food contamination scandals from raising their ugly heads on both sides of the border. But what has kept the two from being Himalayan birds of a feather thus far is their markedly divergent temperament and foundational culture.

The potency of this divergence however, is being increasingly diluted, with the Indian state beginning to sound and act like the country it has long had a schizophrenic relationship with. (Modern day India wants to both be China and not-China: a six lane highway-filled, manufacturing powerhouse that is praised for its political openness and liked for its yoga.)

The abrogation of the special

status that gave autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir and more crucially, the style in which this was achieved – relying on secrecy, troops, arrests, curfew and a communications shutdown – has brought India closer than ever before to the 'results oriented,' actions, unhindered by political debate and democratic niceties, of authoritarian China.

Pacifying restive regions

One obvious commonality between New Delhi and Beijing has been their need to grapple with, and pacify, the restive regions on their peripheries: Kashmir and the Northeast in India, Tibet and Xinjiang in China. All of these regions are home to peoples of a religion that is different from that of the country's majority: Muslim (Kashmir/Xinjiang), Lama Buddhist (Tibet), Christian (Northeast India). All are home to ethno-nationalist movements demanding independence or greater autonomy.

Both China and India have declared these border areas as "integral" parts of their territory and refuse to countenance the possibility that they might be disputed. (China claims that Tibet has been part of the country for over 700 years.)

People with dissenting interpretations are labelled "splitists" or "separatists". The periphery is seen as crucial to national securi-



A.P.

ty, while being described as backward, in need of development assistance.

In China, the ruling Communist Party of China portrays itself as having 'liberated' the people of Tibet and Xinjiang from the backward norms of their religions, ending the feudal dominance of religious leaders, bringing equality to women and economic development to the regions. In fact, many Han Chinese believe that Beijing excessively panders to these provinces by giving them special sops. For example, Tibetans were always excluded from the notorious One Child Policy that restricted most Han families to a single child.

Equality before law, economic development, the empowerment of women: these are all arguments being touted today in favour of ending Jammu and Kashmir's special status; for anyone familiar with China, they render a strong

feeling of déjà vu.

Yet, all this rhetoric skirts the reality of egregious human rights abuses that both countries have used in their nation-building endeavours. Torture, rape, illegal detentions, extra-judicial killings and a militarised environment have ensured that hearts and minds have not been won. A common identity has failed to develop, and as the China case demonstrates, this is not because of too much autonomy.

Dibyesh Anand, Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster, has argued that both India and China are "postcolonial informal empires", whose anti-imperialist rhetoric disguises their imperialistic attempts to "consolidate and discipline their borderlands."

But what used to distinguish India from the more common charges of colonialism faced by China was the fact that the people of Jammu and Kashmir had been provided guarantees under Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution, along with a strong foundation to build a system of local governance. The ban on non-locals buying land, and permanently settling in the State, also prevented demographic engineering like the large-scale Han migration into Tibet and Xinjiang.

Independent India's crowning achievement to date has been the

development of institutional mechanisms for negotiating large-scale diversity and accommodating frequent, aggressive disagreements. This is an achievement that deserves as much awe and respect as China's economic miracle. It might be less shiny and more chaotic, but it is, in its own way, quite spectacular.

Debate and contestation are not a discardable option for India but an existential necessity. Historically, India has been a civilisational rather than territorial entity, more metaphysical than geographic. It is a nation held together not by language, religion or geography, but by an idea. Multiplicity is foundational to this idea. It is what has allowed India to persist and flourish as a political unit, despite the once widespread belief in the West that an independent India would inevitably Balkanise.

The new choices that the Indian government is making may well help cover up some of the cracks that its relatively liberal history was unable to weld. It may also fail to do so and lead to complete rupture. But the risk of India forsaking its own sources of strength – pluralism and debate – to emerge as a second rate copy of its muscular, nationalist neighbour to the north is clear.

Pallavi Aiyar is the author of the China memoir, 'Smoke and Mirrors'

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Letters emailed to letters@thehindu.co.in must carry the full postal address and the full name or the name with initials.

Blackout

Consequent to the scrapping of the special status accorded to Jammu and Kashmir, the imposition of curfew and large-scale deployment of troops for security reasons was understandable. But a complete snapping of communication is puzzling and against democratic principles (Editorial, "Blackout", August 8). When the government has taken such a bold step to abrogate Article 370, why should it now try and hide actual information? The rest of India is anxious and entitled to know what is happening in J&K. Some sections of the media report many in Jammu having welcomed the decision of integration and of calm prevailing. But how is this to be verified? Official information is generally a one-way process which

could black out what could be unfavourable to them. It would be prudent if the government takes steps to remove the restrictions imposed on the communication flow and the movement of people.

D. SETHURAMAN,
Chennai

■ If the intention behind the Central government's abrogation of Article 370 was to ensure the full integration of Kashmir with the Indian Union so that it could enjoy all benefits available to the rest of the country, what was the need to enforce a massive lockdown and communication blackout that is causing enormous hardship to civilians? Many Kashmiris outside the State are under stress unable to contact their families back home. It is akin to the rigorous restrictions Israel imposes on Palestinians that

one reads about. Unless the restrictions are eased soon, alienation among the Kashmiris is bound to increase manifold, which may go against the objective of a mainstreaming emotionally as well.

M.P. MURALIDHARAN,
Bengaluru

■ The complete shutdown is actually helping in the spread of rumours and the dissemination of propaganda. It is time for normalcy to be restored in the Union Territory so as to stop the misgivings in the minds of Kashmiris and allowing them to get on with life.

V. PADMANABHAN,
Bengaluru

■ Draconian measures such as the imposition of curfew, cutting off the information flow and arresting key political leaders have only

vitiated the environment. It is akin to undeclared emergency where the common man is the one most affected. The fact that there was no dialogue at the ground level before announcing the far-reaching changes in J&K has only made matters worse.

D.B.N. MURTHY,
Bengaluru

Sushma Swaraj

Sushma Swaraj belongs to a rare class of politicians who transcended political lines. Many in India and abroad will miss her for her commitment. The country has lost an able administrator and an outstanding parliamentarian. Her record as External Affairs Minister has been phenomenal, extending a mother's touch to all those in distress. Scaling several heights in politics and governance at a very young

age, she is the right model for today's youth. Telangana remembers her as its "Chinnamma".

SATISH REDDY KANAGANTI,
Tippurthy, Nalgonda, Telangana

■ As Health Minister in the Vajpayee government, Ms. Swaraj's visit to Kerala in 2003 remains golden. During her visit, she got to know of two schoolchildren with HIV, shunned by society and refused education as there were reservations by some school parents. There was also an indifferent political class. The children were at a public function where she was present. On getting to know of their plight, she hugged them and assured them of help.

T.V. SREERAMAR,
Puducherry

■ Ms. Swaraj's memorable tweet, that the "Indian Embassy will help you even

on Mars" signifies the level of commitment and positivity she had towards her job. A strong leader, she will always be remembered for her humanism.

AVIK SETHI,
Zirakpur, Mohali, Punjab

Roaring tiger

India is now home to a significant percentage of the global tiger population. But the point now is that when the carrying capacity of forests is breached, tigers will be forced to migrate to new places, in turn making them vulnerable to poaching and infrastructural projects that pass through wildlife corridors. It is pertinent to monitor the health of wildlife corridors as they are vital to sustain the current tiger population.

ABHISHEK M.R.,
Ajikad, Udipi, Karnataka

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Does the Medical Commission Bill encourage quackery?

PARLEY Training practitioners to head health centres is worth trying, but with strong regulations



Sujatha Rao
is former Union
Secretary of Health



Anant Bhan
is a researcher
in global health
and bioethics

On August 1, the Rajya Sabha passed the National Medical Commission Bill, 2019, which provides for the training of certain health-care practitioners for modern medicine. The medical fraternity has vehemently opposed this idea and feels that the Bill will encourage 'quackery'. R. Prasad converses with Sujatha Rao and Anant Bhan on the possible ramifications of the Bill. Edited excerpts:

What is the doctor-patient ratio in India, and how acute is the shortage of allopathic doctors, particularly in rural areas?

Sujatha Rao (SR): As you know, we don't have credible data. But estimates show that there could be about eight lakh doctors actively practising, which would mean that we need an additional five lakh doctors, but that's just a gross estimate. The differentials come between the northern and southern States. There is no doubt that there is adequate number of doctors in both Kerala and Tamil Nadu, whereas in Bihar and the northern States, there is an acute shortage. Again, there is a differential between the rural and urban areas, as a large number of doctors tend to cluster in urban areas. So, even in the so-called surplus States like Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, you may find it difficult to find doctors in the tribal areas or in the very backward rural areas though overall, they may not be as badly off as the northern States.

India as a whole also has a huge shortage of specialists. So, you may have doctors but it does not necessarily mean that they can adequately address certain diseases. The whole question of doctor-population ratio as per the World Health Organisation (WHO) norms doesn't really have much of a meaning. You have to really split it and look at the issue in a granular manner.

Anant Bhan (AB): With allopathic doctors, historically, we have had some degree of shortage. I think there have been attempts to try to address that by opening more medical colleges. We've also had many State-level initiatives to increase the number of medical seats. So, I

mean, there is a clear urban-rural divide; there is also an inter-State divide that is quite stark. Some States seem to be doing fairly well as compared to even probably the WHO requirements. But in many other parts of India, there is an acute shortage. Finally, you might have enough doctors in terms of numbers, but will they actually stay on in rural areas if posted there?

What initiatives have been taken to address this shortage?

SR: There are three broad reasons why the public policy has been weak vis-à-vis the doctors in rural areas. One is inadequate investment; two, the incentive structures have been very weak; and three, the nature of work that a doctor in a primary health-care setting is expected to do in a rural area is very different from the kind of training he gets as an MBBS doctor. So, he's not really toiled and trained to cope with the public health issues. Public health is a very weak area of instruction in an MBBS course.

We have not been able to have a proper training programme that really enables young doctors to go and work in rural areas. In terms of bridging this gap, yes, Chhattisgarh and Assam did work on having a three-year-trained physician, something like the old LMPs (Licentiate Medical Practitioners). They're really very good. I do believe that you don't need full-fledged five-year-trained MBBS doctors to deal with some of the basic public health issues in rural areas. What could be adequate are three-year-trained public health practitioners, who would really address all our infectious diseases and public health requirements of the rural poor. This is how this whole community health worker debate started in 2010.

AB: From what I understand, there are three or four ways in which governments have tried to increase the number of doctors working in rural areas. One is by using incentives for practice in rural areas. We've had a mixed bag with that. In States like Chhattisgarh, that has worked for a limited amount of time. The other model that has been



There is a clear rural-urban divide when it comes to the number of doctors in India. A doctor examining a child in Andhra Pradesh. • GETTY IMAGES

used is that of a 'bond' – once you are trained with government support, you have to serve for a certain number of years after your MBBS or after your postgraduation. That has also been a mixed bag; in some States it has been implemented, in other States, it has been very poorly implemented. The third idea is having in-service, postgraduation seats. The government reserves postgraduation seats specifically for those candidates who work for a certain number of years with the government. That has helped to some extent. These are the three or four models. [But] I don't think we have really had a comprehensive way of being able to respond to the gap yet.

Do you think short-term training of people who don't have medical qualification would be sufficient?

SR: I have seen them in the field and they are not good enough to cope with the challenges. I liked what they did in Chhattisgarh with the three-year course. They trained them [the students] in medical colleges like any other student but then restricted them to public health. I'm not very interested in these bridge courses and six-month programmes. I don't think they can be very effective.

AB: The bridge course is an interesting approach. I think it is not the unqualified medical practitioners

who are being trained but formal health-care providers of some kind, whether they are nurse practitioners; or nurses who are being converted to nurse practitioners; or AYUSH (Ayurveda, Yoga, Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy) doctors. All of them have had some health experience.

The question is: Will a six-month course be enough? And what exactly does it train them to do differently than what they were already doing? If they are to be deployed as middle-level care providers or community health officers, do they have adequate skills at the end of six months? And on what empirical evidence is that six-month period being decided? I think reducing the training to six months is a bit of a concern. I guess the reason they're doing this is that it is difficult to get candidates to be trained beyond that, or maybe governments are not willing to stay at them for longer.

Do you think the short-term training of community providers will lead to substandard care for the rural population?

SR: For whatever reasons, doctors are not going to rural areas and there is a huge gap between demand and supply. Now, there has to be a sort of short-term measure. Auxiliary nurse midwives, who are trained for 18 months, are already giving antibiotics and are also in-

involved in immunisation programmes. Even if the nurses stay for 16 months or 18 months as a nurse practitioner, then it's going to be a game changer. But then there must also be a focus on quality. Our bureaucrats are constantly looking for numbers. So they come with all the silly ideas of three- and six-month training [courses] and force the system to churn out substandard training and we end up with people giving substandard treatment.

AB: We already allow certain kinds of health-care providers [non-doctors] to give medicines. The question is: How wide should the scope of such practice be? But I think that fundamental redesign where [such providers] will be heading the health and wellness centres is an experiment worth trying.

Who do you think should be chosen to undergo this training?

SR: Nurses, if trained well, can be a great asset. Or you can have, like in Chhattisgarh, the three-year trained rural medical practitioners. AYUSH doctors provided with some public health training could be a great asset. But I am wondering whether that's the appropriate cadre to bring in as AYUSH by itself has so many strengths. Why on earth are we getting well-qualified AYUSH practitioners to practise allopathic medicine? But then, there's also the political [angle], where AYUSH doctors want to get into government service by becoming mid-level providers.

AB: Individuals currently being considered are certified health providers of some kind. They are not qualified to be allopathic doctors but they are qualified to be nurses or AYUSH doctors.

The individuals who have been considered for even the middle-level care provider positions are people who are within the health system already, or who have trained in some way already and could be taking on this additional position. So, it's in a sense retraining [or] additional training for them.

There are two models for health and wellness centres – AYUSH doctors going through a bridge course, or nurse practitioners going through a bridge course. The Chhat-

tisgarh and Assam model is currently not being tried out. [But considering that] it worked fairly well for rural health care, it's also an experiment worth looking at. However, they [these courses] faced so much opposition from the doctors' collectives, especially the IMA [Indian Medical Association]. And that is going to be an issue whenever you try to scale up any of these programmes. Yet, we don't really have an alternative model.

Further, unless we try out some of these experiments, we will never know and the status quo is not something we should be finding acceptable any longer. I think we've had rural populations and large sections of the population suffering for many years due to the absence of quality health care, and that needs to change. And if that requires certain experiments to happen, those should certainly be tried. But [it should be tried] with regulation, with adequate planning, with adequate lead time, with evidence gathered about whether it works or not.

Do you foresee a situation where the solution, in the form of community health providers, becomes a problem bigger than the shortage of doctors we face today?

SR: It depends on how the designing and implementation goes along. If they [the government] do it all in a hurried way, then the prognosis is not going to be good. But if they have a plan, then it can be a game changer.

But perceptions of patients are changing, preferences are changing, people are not willing to settle even for a nurse. In a State like Kerala, they're not willing to look at even MBBS doctors, they only want specialists. So, these partially trained people may not get preference and may fall by the wayside.

AB: For better or worse, we have to see how the experiment goes. I think a continuous redesign, actually having a strong evaluation framework, a strong regulatory governance framework is extremely important. My sense is that if the experiment fails, it will be abandoned before the number of these providers is too high. I think the key equation is whether this experiment is worth trying or not.

Much ado about little

Hollowing out of Article 370, which had become a shadow of its original self, doesn't come as a surprise

MOHAMMED AYOOB

The government's decision to abrogate Jammu and Kashmir's special status was duly rubber-stamped by Parliament. Provisions of Article 370 were used selectively to undermine the basic thrust of the Article, namely, regional autonomy.

Close observers of the Indian scene had anticipated this action for some time for a number of reasons.

First, this move has been part of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)'s agenda since it was established in April 1980. It had also been a part of the founding agenda of its predecessor, the Jana Sangh, since Shyama Prasad Mookerjee launched it in 1951. The BJP, when in office from 1998 to 2004, was unable to implement it because it was part of a coalition, and other members of the coalition were averse to any such action.

Erosion began in 1953

Second, and more important, over the years, Article 370 had become merely a shadow of its original self and, therefore, largely redundant as far as the governance of Jammu and Kashmir was concerned.

The process of its erosion began in 1953 with the removal of Sheikh Abdullah from the office of Prime Minister of Kashmir by the Jawaharlal Nehru government on suspicion that he harboured secessionist tendencies. To stay in power, Abdullah's successors, especially Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and Mir Qasim, were more than willing to see the Centre expand its tentacles into the State by successively amending or distorting Article 370.

The Congress Party, which is shedding tears today at the abolition of the State's special status, was primarily responsible for the attrition of its autonomy over six decades.

Even after Sheikh Abdullah returned to power in 1975 by accepting a watered-down version of the autonomy guaranteed under Article 370, Jammu and Kashmir's special status continued to be more a myth than reality. This was demonstrated very clearly in the 1980s when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi forced the Na-


tional Conference, led by Farooq Abdullah, into a shotgun marriage with the Congress Party.

The 1987 elections were allegedly rigged to deny the Muslim United Front a sizeable number of seats in the State Assembly that it was projected to win. The insurgency and terrorism in the Valley in the past three decades can be traced directly to this folly that turned peaceful opponents into violent adversaries. It played directly into Pakistan's hands and provided it the opportunity to export terrorist groups into Kashmir to create mayhem and anarchy.

Article 370 had, therefore, become merely a symbol without any real content of Jammu and Kashmir's autonomy and special status. New Delhi's interference in the State was of a far greater order than was the case with any other State in the Union. The Narendra Modi-Amit Shah duo have merely removed the veneer of the State's special status, thus exploding the myth that India's only Muslim-majority State was being shown greater favour by the Centre in comparison with other States. This myth helped Hindu nationalist forces to mobilise not only against

Articles 370 and 35A; it also contributed hugely to their propaganda that Congress governments were engaged in appeasing Muslims. Jammu and Kashmir's "special status" can no longer be used as a stick to beat Muslims from the rest of the country, who should distance themselves from this controversy for two reasons. First, the Hinduist propagandists will tout any opposition as "anti-national". Second, Muslims in other parts of India owe nothing to Kashmiri Muslims who have in fact become an albatross around their necks by not unequivocally opposing the violence committed by terrorists among them and by raising "azadi" slogans. Further, Muslims from Kashmir have not exactly shown empathy when it comes to the vital concerns of Muslims in the rest of India.

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NOTEBOOK

In the right place, at the right time

On being the first Indian to report on Kailash Satyarthi's Nobel win

P.J. GEORGE

Reporting is driven by curiosity, skill, experience, and, sometimes, pure luck.

Journalists who happened to be in the right place at the right time have delivered some of the greatest scoops in the business. Clare Hollingworth, the great war correspondent who broke the news of the outbreak of the Second World War, figured it out when the wind blew apart a cloth separator at the Germany-Poland border while she was crossing it, and she got a momentary glimpse of tanks parked in the valley below, ready to move into Poland.

While in the hierarchy of journalists, Hollingworth would be somewhere in the upper atmosphere and I in the lower depths of the Pacific, luck is thankfully agnostic in its favours.

It was the 2014 Nobel season and Malala Yousafzai was a favourite to win

the Peace Prize. Unlike the science and literature prizes that are announced in Stockholm, Sweden, the Peace Prize is Norway's territory. The winner is announced by the Norwegian Nobel Committee in Oslo in October. This is where the 'right-place-right-time' part falls into place.

Arctic programme

I had reached Oslo at the beginning of October for a slew of interviews and to learn about Norway's Arctic programme. The then-Indian President Pranab Mukherjee was set to arrive in the Norwegian capital a few days later, and a focus area of the visit was India's Arctic programme at Himadri Station, the base located in Norway's Svalbard.

After several days of interviews and presentations, by October 10, I was thoroughly horrified by the potential impact of melting polar ice caps and rising sea levels, and had sought

refuge in my hotel room. It was then that a sympathetic contact in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry mentioned that my press pass could get me into the Peace Prize announcement at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, a few minutes' walk away.

Given the chance to break the tension over impending climatic doom with some award-winning drama, I walked into the press meet and hung around at the back of the room. There was considerable buzz among the media since Ms. Yousafzai was in the running; so when the Nobel Committee chair and former Norwegian PM Thorbjorn Jagland spoke her name, two Japanese television journalists standing near me started screaming 'Malala, Malala' at their cameras and had to be shushed by the rest of the journalists. By then, I had completely missed the second winner's name.

Fortune favours even the

not-so-bold since, seconds later, the circular with the press statement reached the back of the room, and my brain caught on that Kailash Satyarthi was also a winner.

Framing a question

My body took a few more seconds. Then I rushed to the front row on the authority of my shared brown skin with the winners. That worked, since Mr. Jagland quickly acknowledged my raised hand. It was also unfortunate as I was yet to frame a question with enough gravitas on an Indian and a Pakistani sharing the Peace Nobel.

After a short staring contest with the former Premier, I managed to blurt out a tolerable question which got a passable answer. I plopped down immediately after that to file a copy for *The Hindu's* website, becoming the first Indian to report on that historic event.

The Hindu

FROM THE ARCHIVES

FIFTY YEARS AGO AUGUST 9, 1969

'Social control' of private sector

The formulation of a policy for the "social control" of the private sector is now understood to be engaging the attention of the Union Government, which is at present considering the recommendations of the Industrial Licensing Policy Enquiry Committee. In the course of its recommendations, the Committee has evolved the concept of "joint sector" which refers to the private sector firms, a substantial part of whose production operations is financed by public financing institutions. While State participation in private firms through the financial institutions has been there for a number of years now, the Committee has urged the adoption of more effective State control. Besides the State getting its representation in the management of the private sector units, the Committee has suggested that the financial institutions should insist on the whole or part of their assistance in the form of loans and debentures being convertible into equity at their option. The Committee has suggested that the law should be amended, if necessary, to provide for this.

A HUNDRED YEARS AGO AUGUST 9, 1919

Lala Lajpat Rai. Unable to Return.

Lala Lajpat Rai writes in 'Young India' of New York: I am exceedingly sorry that the Secretary of State's order prevents my going to India and England just when I wanted most to be there. India is in the grip of a terrible famine and the conditions there are very distressing. For the last 25 years of my life I have been taking active part in the work of famine relief and it pains me considerably to feel at this juncture that I should be unable to do anything for my people. Events are developing rapidly in India and every Indian who feels for his country and is desirous of taking part in its life must feel that his place is there in the midst of his countrymen and not 12,000 miles away from home in a position of comparative safety, comfort and ease. Personally I am not sorry for having been in the United States during the war, but now I am overwhelmed with a sense of guilt at not being in India, to play my part in the great struggle which my countrymen are carrying on against such great odds. This war was fought to free the world. Its immediate effect is the tightening of the chains of those who were in bonds before and who were induced to fight for world democracy. Will the governing classes learn nothing from history?"