

The antibiotics challenge

Don't extend price caps on drugs

An expert committee, according to a report in this newspaper, is likely to recommend to the drug price regulator that it should "rationalise" caps on antibiotic prices by bringing non-branded generic medicines into the net.

Currently, branded antibiotics like Augmentin have a margin cap of 8 per cent for stockists and 16 per cent for retailers, while their wholesale prices are fixed by the regulator. Similar regulations will now be introduced, if the National Pharmaceutical Price Authority agrees, for generic antibiotics. The immediate impact of such a change is not known, although it is speculated that hospital margins will be most affected. But this is an opportune moment to reflect on the problems with price caps on antibiotics in general. Rather than helping consumer welfare, they destroy value and hurt the consumer.

Any price cap has a supply response. The supply response in the case of medicines like antibiotics will be harmful in many ways. First, shortages of drugs brought under price control may become common: Rationing may take place if the price cut is particularly deep. Resources could be transferred to more profitable production of drugs whose price is not capped, for example. Some companies can exit from producing certain pills entirely. Others might collude with doctors or hospitals to ensure that pills that are excluded from price caps are the ones being recommended — this is perhaps what is happening with regard to branded and non-branded generics. The second form of response will exacerbate the problem: A supply response that will adversely affect quality. Drug makers will cut corners, and in the absence of proper regulatory supervision will produce pills of poor quality. Inappropriate prescriptions are already a serious problem in India and price caps have made them worse. A study by researchers at the Indian School of Business on the supply and demand response in India to the introduction of price caps for Metformin, a medicine used for the treatment of Type II diabetes, showed that all these effects were visible. In addition, companies colluded with one another to capture the market for Metformin following the regulation of the price of Metformin 500, in particular. None of the companies has been hauled up so far for such actions. Regulation without the capacity for follow-up implementation is a bad idea and should be avoided.

Overall, research and studies have established that the effect of pharmaceutical price controls in India is adverse. Emma Dean of the Centre for Global Development in Washington, DC, has shown that an outcome of price caps in India was "decreased sales of price-controlled and closely related products". In other words, some patients could no longer access the drugs. Prof Dean shows that this disproportionately harms poorer and rural consumers.

The obvious corollary is that richer consumers with better access to drugs can procure them more easily. This also encourages an unhealthy rise of inappropriate prescriptions and their misuse by some patients. With antibiotics, the overall effect of such inappropriate prescriptions would then be particularly dangerous — over-prescription to those who do not need the drug. India is already the worst country in the world for antibiotic resistance, which is a global crisis. India also faces a public health crisis, thanks to poor quality drugs being universally available. As the country moves to universal healthcare, it should move away from arbitrary price controls for drugs.

Warship woes

India needs a clear road map to build naval capacity

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh was correct in stating that the Indian Navy could deal Pakistan a heavier blow today than in 1971, when Indian missile boats attacked Karachi port. But Mr Singh has set his sights very low. The Karachi strikes, while morale boosting, were eventually peripheral to the outcome of that war. Today, given that Indian Navy's budget of \$8 billion is only slightly smaller than Pakistan's entire defence allocation of \$11 billion, far more would be expected from it. New Delhi's strategic vision of the Indo-Pacific requires the Indian Navy to exercise control over not just the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, but all of the northern Indian Ocean from the Strait of Hormuz in West Asia, to the Malacca Strait in the East. In achieving this, the key challenge would come not from Pakistan's weak navy, but from a bigger and stronger China, which is already asserting its presence in these waters. The question for Indian planners is: How ready is the Indian Navy for that?

Serious capability shortfalls are evident from the Navy's demand for a larger share of the defence modernisation budget. In an unusually blunt statement last fortnight, the Navy vice-chief publicly lamented that, in the last seven years, its share of the overall defence budget has dropped from 18 per cent to under 14 per cent today. Meanwhile, its share of the capital budget has fallen from over 30 per cent to less than 24 per cent today. The Indian Navy's long-term capability plan envisions a fleet of 200 warships and 450 aircraft by 2027, but it currently has just 131 warships and 230 aircraft. Worse, most shortfalls are in capital warships — the multi-role destroyers, frigates and corvettes that are the Navy's workhorses. Submarines are in short supply and the government's inability to conclude a long-delayed contract for building 24 minesweepers has left the Navy with not one of these crucial vessels.

Equally worrying, many capital warships built in the last two decades are operating without sensors and weapons that are central to their capability. Most of the Navy's modern vessels are not fitted with modern towed array sonars, essential for detecting enemy submarines. These warships, each costing several hundred million dollars, risk being torpedoed because of the absence of sonars worth a few million dollars each. Similarly, the Scorpene submarines now entering service at half a billion dollars each are toothless because contracts have not been concluded for modern torpedoes. As a stopgap, the Navy's decades-old SUT torpedoes have been given a lifetime extension but the numbers are falling to barely six torpedoes per submarine.

Part of the blame lies with the Navy, which designs quality warships, but builds just three-to-four vessels in each design class. In comparison, the US Navy builds to a standardised design — it commissioned USS Arleigh Burke in 1988, and has since built 82 destroyers of that class. This allows for incremental design and process improvements and economy of scale for vendors and sub-vendors. In comparison, the Indian Navy's 12 destroyers are spread over three different designs. The challenges before the Navy are clear. Rather than bluster, it is time for the government to set a clear road map, allocate the finances needed and facilitate the Navy in creating the capability needed for supporting India's strategic vision in the region.

ILLUSTRATION: BINAY SINHA



The way forward for public sector banks

Regulation and supervision of all banks should be made ownership neutral

A release from the Press Information Bureau on June 24, titled "Public Sector Banks", had this to say on strengthening PSBs: "Over the last four financial years, the Government of India has taken comprehensive steps under its 4R strategy of recognising NPAs transparently, resolving and recovering value from stressed accounts through clean and effective laws and processes, re-capitalising banks, and reforming banks through the PSB reform agenda".

There seems to be some confusion between the legitimate functions of the sovereign; the owner; the regulator and the board or management. Recognising NPAs is a matter for the management and the regulator, namely the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). It is common to banking industry as a whole, and not restricted to the public sector. Legislating clean and effective laws and processes is the legitimate function of the sovereign, but that is also common to PSBs, cooperative and private sector banks. Indeed, common to financial sector. Recapitalising banks is a legitimate function of owners; and in the case of PSBs, the government is the owner of majority shares but not the only shareholder. Some clarity on the PSB reform as distinct from the eco-system of the banking industry is essential in considering the way forward.

The press release also stated that PSBs have been recapitalised with an amount of ₹3.19 trillion during 2014-19. An additional amount of ₹70,000 crore towards PSB recapitalisation has

been budgeted for 2019-20. Additional infusion of capital may be needed, if the performance of PSBs continues to be as in the past. To meet capital adequacy norms and retain majority ownership, additional capital will be needed if PSBs do well, and expand their business. Either way, there could be demands on fiscal unless policies change in future.

Union finance minister announced on August 30 the merger of 10 PSBs into four. Is size an advantage for pursuing the objectives of public sector banking?

Current realities

After the nationalisation of banks in 1969, banking became synonymous with PSBs. But now, private sector banks have significant presence. Further, PSBs are no longer owned 100 per cent by the government. Shares of PSBs are held by FIIs, domestic entities and individuals. By recapitalising unilaterally, the government has injected capital into PSBs, but the other shareholders have not. Whether the unilateral capital infusion by the government has disproportionately benefited non-government shareholders is unclear.

With the recent recapitalisation, the share of government has increased significantly in many banks. Interestingly, the share of domestic private shareholding is minuscule in larger private sector banks. In brief, banking system in India is predominantly government-owned or foreign-owned. Will this persist?



WHAT NEXT

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Real interest rate dynamics: Who can help?

Availability and cost of funds are both key drivers of economic growth. The role of India's financial sector in achieving the \$5 trillion economy target is therefore critical. While financial entities will do their share of work, it's important to understand the constraints they face in lowering the cost of funds.

Economists focus on the real rate of interest to gauge the impact on growth. The cost of money has to be set off against its purchasing power. While savers prefer a higher real interest rate, borrowers want this to be low. The trick is to find the optimal real interest rate that produces desired levels of growth.

The choice of interest rate in measuring this real interest rate is critical. A good representative rate would be one at which companies and individuals borrow as it takes into account the "risk" element.

Corporate bond yields are a good proxy. Economists point out that real interest rates are high for India and hamper sustained growth. The real interest on 10-year AAA corporate bond is 1.23 per cent in the US, 1.40 per cent in China, and 5.27 per cent in India.

That's because real interest on corporate bonds can be thought of as an amalgam of risk-free (government bond) real interest rate and risk premium. A major reason for the difference in real interest rates is the difference in risk-free real interest rates. A comparison of 10-year government securities minus inflation shows that India (3.57 per cent) has a higher rate than China (0.31 per cent) and the US (0.02 per cent).

This difference in risk-free real interest rates depends on how much the government borrows. Higher the fiscal burden, the higher the likely risk-free rate. According to International Monetary Fund data, the consolidated fiscal deficit is 1.4 per cent of the GDP in the UK, and 4.8 per cent in China, compared to over 6 per cent in India.

This brings us to risk premium added to real risk-free interest rate to arrive at effective real cost of

borrowing. For India, risk premium on AAA bonds is 1.7 per cent to US' 1.2 per cent and China's 1.08 per cent. The reason this is high is because premiums represent risk and what better index of possible default than the ratio of bad loans to total.

A comparison of gross non-performing loan percentages tells us why India's risk premia are high. The ratio for Malaysia is 1.54 per cent, the US 1.12 per cent and the UK 0.73 per cent as against 9.98 per cent for India. So while borrowers ask for lower rates, good credit habits would help.

Lending and deposit rates must be seen in conjunction. Higher deposit rates set a floor to lending rates. The one-year deposit rate in India is 6.5 per cent (SBI) compared to 3.1 per cent in Malaysia, 1.75 per cent in China and 1.5 per cent in Thailand. The question is: Can deposit rates be brought down without compromising the flow of household savings into India's financial system? Let's remember India faces a shortage of savings. Household saving after netting out liabilities was 6.6 per cent of GDP in 2017-18 (8.1 per cent in 2015-16).

There's a misleading argument that Indian banks earn exorbitant margins on loans, reflected in their high net interest margins (NIMs), and have ample space to reduce lending rates. This is based on selective data where margins of a few private banks are shown to be over 3.5 per cent while that of developed markets, say the UK, is 1.7 per cent. This is comparing apples to oranges. Indian banks' margins do not reflect provisions for credit risk, while those of the UK do.

If we were to use the same accounting norm (from Bankscope), India's average NIMs work out to 2.5 per cent (only 2 per cent for PSBs) for 2018, while Thailand's was 2.9 per cent, the Philippines' 3.3 per cent and the US' 3.3 per cent.

There's a correlation between wage rates and real interest rates. The more tepid the wage growth, the higher the real interest rate. Higher the wage growth, higher the demand and thus inflation. For developed



ADITYA PURI

In Babu and Ba's shadow



BOOK REVIEW

CHINTAN GIRISH MODI

his personality and his ideas make him a sure-shot winner.

MKG's legacy is worth studying but the commemorative moment is more about platitudes, less about critical engagement. In making one person the face of an entire movement, and elevating him to a god-like status, we erase the labour of those who worked behind the scenes and lived in the shadows. Regardless of whether they cared to be in the spotlight or not, we need to recognise the contributions of those unsung individuals who served tirelessly in India's struggle for freedom from British rule. They may not have fought on the frontlines, or taken a bullet, but that does not diminish their sacrifices.

The Diary of Manu Gandhi 1943-1944 sheds light on one such person. Manu aka Mridula Gandhi was the youngest daughter of MKG's nephew — Jaisukhlal

Amritlal Gandhi — and Kasumba. She came to live with MKG and his wife Kasturba, and called them Babu and Ba respectively. Her biological mother had passed away. Manu became a satyagrahi at the age of 14. She spent her time as a prisoner in Wardha Jail, Nagpur Central Jail, and the Aga Khan Palace in Pune. While in Pune, she began writing a diary on April 11, 1943. Twelve volumes of Manu's diaries, predominantly written in Gujarati, are lodged in the National Archives of India. Tridip Suvrud has translated, edited and annotated diary entries from that collection to put together this book. His reputation as a scholar of the Gandhian intellectual tradition raises expectations from this book, and it does not disappoint.

MKG had made it obligatory for ashramites and satyagrahis to maintain

a diary as a practice of self-examination and self-purification that would help them in the pursuit of truth. However, Mr Suvrud's translation indicates Manu's diary was not a private container for her thoughts and feelings. MKG read, signed and commented on what she wrote. He pointed out spelling errors, and rectified them. He encouraged her to keep an account of the yarn she spun, and record all that she read. He also asked her to improve her handwriting, and note what she learnt from others.

Mr Suvrud has retained these corrections and comments, offering an explanation for these interventions wherever possible. MKG taught Manu about scripture and philosophy, truth and forbearance, health and nutrition. He looked out for her but was also a proponent of tough love. While Manu thought of MKG as "more than a mother," he might come across to contemporary readers as autocratic and abusive.

Manu writes in detail about her daily

schedule. Apart from participating in morning and evening prayers, and attending lessons with MKG and other elders, she has a lot of work to do. This includes cooking meals, preparing juice, making tea, taking Babu for walks when he is unable to walk without support, applying ghee to Babu and Ba's feet, and being on call for Ba in a period of deteriorating health. Manu oils and combs Ba's hair, gives her massages, helps Ba with her bath, and puts up with her temper tantrums that are nothing but an expression of her agony caused by illness.

On one occasion, Manu writes, "The temperature measured 102.5°C, which for Ba's condition is high. She has a burning sensation in the urinary tract. She has become very weak. Last night she could not sleep at all. She would lie down, get up, and sit. I was with Ba in her bed. She clung to me like a child clings to her mother." On another occasion, Manu writes, "Motiba was rather unwell. Every five to 10 minutes, she would need to defecate.

Sometimes, even her clothes were soiled. I would wash her clothes each time they were soiled."

In Mr Suvrud's translation, Manu appears deeply devoted to Babu and Ba. She falls ill repeatedly while discharging her duties and tries to hide this from others. When speak to her harshly, she assigns blame to herself. This must have been a challenging experience for someone of her age who lost her mother early in life, and also saw Ba withering away. Her emotional universe, filled with struggle and resilience, is at the heart of this book. Read it for her, not MKG.

THE DIARY OF MANU GANDHI 1943-1944

Tridip Suvrud (editor and translator) Oxford University Press 184 pages, ₹750

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