

Come clean on the fisc

If taxes fall short, it should not be covered up

The Union finance ministry has reportedly informed the Fifteenth Finance Commission of the straitened nature of Indian public finances. The ministry is of the opinion that the tax shortfall in the ongoing fiscal year will be around ₹2 trillion. This is in the same ballpark as the degree by which the provisional actuals for the last fiscal year, 2018-19, were less than the Budget estimates. The last Union Budget projected revenue for the coming year at ₹22.4 trillion. A shortfall of this magnitude would mean that either revenue would be raised from non-tax sources, spending would have to be severely crunched, or the fiscal deficit would miss the target of 3.3 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). None of these is a palatable option. A fiscal crunch at a time when the Indian economy has clearly slowed sharply would run the risk of entrenching the slowdown or even turning into a downward, self-reinforcing spiral. Raising non-tax revenue could be one option. However, things have not moved fast enough on this front. The government will need to move ahead with the stated idea of strategic sale to bridge the shortfall in receipts under other heads.

On the other hand, if expenditure cannot be compressed — and the finance minister has publicly committed to preserving the amount of capital spending in particular — then, in other words, the fiscal deficit might effectively increase from the targeted 3.3 per cent of GDP to something closer to 4 per cent. The fact is that this reversal of the fiscal consolidation process will throw into question the entire glide path to 3 per cent of GDP, which has long been promised. But transparency is a virtue in and of itself. The credibility of government figures has been questioned widely following the Union Budget's reliance on the inflated, revised estimates of tax revenue rather than the provisional actuals, which were estimated after last year's tax shortfall had become clearer. This added to the confusion about the actual borrowing target of the whole public sector — a confusion created partly by the decision to use borrowing against public-sector enterprise balance sheets to fund spending that might previously have been accounted for in the Union Budget.

The credibility of government budgeting needs to be restored. There has been a crisis of private investment in India partly because of the ongoing uncertainty about the nature and quality of public-sector spending. This uncertainty must end and transparency restored. A real fiscal picture must be provided. It will also help in addressing the problems in both revenue and expenditure more transparently. The finance minister promised at the International Monetary Fund meeting that India would stick to the fiscal consolidation programme. While her determination to not review the fiscal deficit target is admirable, the reality may be different. The problems with the goods and services tax and the slowdown that impacts direct tax revenue are certainly major events that would affect the budgeting and fiscal consolidation paths of any government anywhere. A one-time re-evaluation of the fiscal position and a new credible glide path or spending framework, alongside a transparent public-sector borrowing requirement, should be priority for the finance ministry.

Turmoil in the marketplace

FDI norms for e-commerce should be relaxed

A party that promised the business community a radical departure from the Congress' economic management appears to be copying its worst practices straight from the bad old days of the licence-permit raj. Last week, the government asked top e-commerce retailers Amazon and Flipkart, the Indian arm of Walmart, to furnish details of its top five sellers, investments, and commission agreement with vendors. The inaptly named Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) has sent both the e-commerce giants separate questionnaires, asking them to provide details of their capital structure, business model, and inventory management system. There are several questionable aspects to this move. First, the investigation has been initiated on a complaint from a brick-and-mortar retail traders' lobby, the Confederation of All India Traders (CAIT), which alleges that these online marketplaces have been violating norms on foreign direct investment (FDI) to report their highest ever sales over Dussehra.

This surge stood in stark contrast to the noticeably poor footfalls in brick-and-mortar outlets and undeniably pointed to high online discounts. It is unclear why the government should mobilise its own administrative capacity to launch this investigation when an independent competent authority in the shape of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) exists to deal with complaints of such restrictive trade practices. Given that the CCI has investigatory powers, it would have been appropriate for the CAIT to have referred its complaint to the CCI or for the government to have done so. The fact that the CAIT has been an enthusiastic supporter of the Bharatiya Janata Party may explain why the government has decided to defend its interests from deep-pocketed foreign-owned online platforms.

The CAIT's principal accusation is that Amazon and Flipkart have violated FDI norms by enabling deeper discounts, which undercut its member-retailers. These rules, which came into play in February this year, were designed specifically to protect domestic online and physical retailers and have no embedded economic logic. One, they debarred companies from exclusive marketing arrangements with foreign-owned online portals. Two, online entities with foreign investment cannot offer products sold by retailers in which they hold an equity stake. Third, online e-commerce giants are debarred from stocking 25 per cent of their inventory from a single vendor. Fourth, such online marketplaces were prohibited from manipulating the prices of products or offering deep discounts. If such micro-managed protectionism contradicts the spirit of a forward-looking globalised economy that India aspires to be, it also reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the online business. Rather than being the product of undercutting, online discounts are the result of significantly lower distribution costs by eliminating one key element of the retail chain — the retail store. Suppliers to these online marketplaces may choose to leverage this competitive cost structure to offer deeper discounts during festive seasons. Physical retailers do the same thing but can never hope to compete because of higher cost structures.

Foreign marketplaces may well have been violating FDI norms. And by mobilising its political clout, the CAIT may well have introduced an irritant in their functioning. But if its members hope to extract lasting gains from these investigations, they are not only behind the curve but destined to fall behind even further as the Indian consumer embraces e-commerce, foreign or otherwise, with unpatriotic enthusiasm. The government would have done better to have relaxed its February press note rather than enforcing a level playing field.

ILLUSTRATION: AJAY MOHANTY



A week with investors

India is well-positioned to benefit from a slowing China, provided it drives a growth and reform agenda

I had the opportunity to spend a week in the US, attending conferences and meeting with global allocators. It was an interesting time to be meeting with investors. India had just announced the tax cuts and the UN general Assembly session was on in New York. The following are my takeaways as far as India goes.

1. There was strong interest in India, and in trying to understand the current situation. Most were pleasantly surprised by the tax cuts — not something they had expected from the Indian government. Questions were asked as to why a corporation tax cut, and not more focused demand creation measures. Most were intrigued as to why the authorities had not announced a middle-class tax cut or cuts in duties on certain goods and services. India is not known for being extra friendly to large corporations, MNCs and highly profitable companies, the main beneficiaries of these tax cuts. Some asked as to how companies will use the tax cuts and increased cash flows. As is well known, in the US, companies mostly pay out a tax windfall through higher buybacks and dividends. Investors were keen to know why Indian companies were different. There was excitement over potential further reforms. Strategic sale of government assets was seen as a big positive, as was talk of simplifying personal tax rates. Most felt that India still remains a very complex place. Lots can still be done to make it easier to do business in the country.

2. Most allocators accepted that India was at the bottom of the economic cycle. Five per cent GDP growth should be as bad as it gets. With both the fiscal and monetary policy levers now being pulled, the economy should begin to recover. It is also going to be one year since the NBFC crisis. The effects of the credit crunch will soon be in the base. Only a few thought that growth will not improve in calendar year 2020. The fiscal was a concern but most felt the trade off, to

risk a higher deficit to boost growth, was worth it. Every investor felt that the current posture of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to give equal weight to both growth and inflation was the right approach. A Fed-like dual mandate approach was much preferred to an ECB-like obsession with only inflation exhibited in the past.

3. There was concern as to why corporate profits have disappointed so significantly in India. Many asked as to whether there was some kind of paradigm shift driving lower corporate profitability in the country. Will there ever be regression to the mean? Everyone had seen the data or heard the numbers from India fund managers. In 2008, corporate profit-to-GDP in both India and the US was similar at about 7.5 per cent. Today, the same number in the US is over 10 per cent, while in India the profit share has collapsed to under 3 per cent. The tax cuts will drive an earnings upgrade, the first in over seven years. Investors accepted that the profit share cannot keep dropping. Most were willing to believe that we will see a period of strong corporate profits once the economy revives.

4. Though investors were willing to accept that both the economic and profit cycle had bottomed for India, the concern holding them back from adding money to the country was valuations. Looking at India from a top-down MSCI index perspective, the market was simply not cheap enough. Neither on an absolute basis, nor when compared to the broader emerging markets universe. Only a few were aware of the damage to stocks, below the surface. The mid-cap indices are down 30 per cent, from their peak in January 2018, with small-caps down 40 per cent. Quality trade has gone to an extreme, with a large portion of the market now simply seen as uninvestable. The price damage in selected stocks and sectors has been simply breath-taking. Many stocks are falling on low volumes in the absence of buying. If global allocators can be convinced that once they go beyond the top 50 companies, the Indian market is



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Taxing or trading our environmental sins?

Record-breaking temperatures and extreme weather events leave no choice but to act on climate change. At the United Nations, the prime minister announced a higher target of 450 gigawatts of renewables. India takes climate action seriously. But the less others act, the more India's development options get constrained by a shrinking global carbon budget. Renewables and energy efficiency are not enough; emissions must be reduced in industry and transport too. If India were to be more aggressive on mitigation — in the most cost-effective way — what instruments should it choose? Should we tax or trade our environmental sins?

India has used several measures in recent years: Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) for energy efficiency in major industries; Renewable Energy Certificates trading scheme; coal cess; and sectoral incentives (monetary and regulatory) to promote clean and efficient electricity. But these measures are not economy-wide and do not always translate directly into greenhouse gas mitigation. For more than a year, representatives from industry, academia and think-tanks have discussed direct mitigation instruments and developed a framework to evaluate options.

The first option is an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). An absolute cap on emissions combined with trading gives flexibility to businesses, promotes innovation and reduces pollution. Globally, over 50 jurisdictions have ETS markets. Complementary policies increase effectiveness. Policies that promote renewables, energy efficiency, incentivise fuel switching, improve building standards, or increase public transport have helped the EU and Californian schemes. Their experience suggests that administrative costs could be less than 1 per cent of total abatement costs.

India, too, has similar complementary policies. The PAT scheme shows that effectiveness increases when there are relatively fewer regulated entities. Regulating fewer upstream entities (say, a refinery) reduces administrative costs compared to many dispersed downstream points of emissions (say, millions of small industrial units). For its stage of development, India should choose either an increasing emissions

cap, or one based on emissions intensity of production. While consistent with its current policies, the choice would ultimately depend on international ETS market developments. Whether emissions permits are allocated by government or auctioned, it must be fair and transparent. If there were no global and equitable allocation of emissions allowances, could an ETS in India trade with other markets in China, Europe or North America? Could carbon and non-carbon credits be linked, to capture co-benefits of mitigation and adaptation? Answering such questions would help India design more fit-for-purpose ETS markets, with robust monitoring and verification, while continuing to reduce abatement costs.

A second option is a carbon tax. There are 26 carbon tax systems worldwide, which raised \$33 billion in 2017. By 2020, existing and planned taxes will cover about 5 per cent of global CO₂ emissions. Economists debate whether a carbon tax should apply to two or more sources using the same rate per tonne of CO₂ equivalent (tCO₂e). Such a definition would exclude India's coal cess or excise duties on petrol and diesel. The real question should be: What tax would nudge behaviour? Relative prices that shift behaviours vary across sectors. From a sectoral perspective, carbon taxes have worked best when alternatives are readily available. Otherwise, the cost imposition does not translate into desired mitigation outcomes.

The hardest decision concerns the tax rate. It varies from \$3 per tCO₂e in Japan, \$5 in Chile to \$132 in Sweden. India's choice would depend on its priority: Social cost of carbon; GHGs abated; targeted revenues; or benchmarking against trading partners to maintain competitiveness. Tax rates could be further indexed to inflation (Iceland), gradually increase (France) or have formula-based adjustments to factor in macroeconomic conditions and technological advances (Switzerland).

Carbon tax revenues must be deployed justly and transparently. A revenue-neutral approach would reduce other taxes. Alternatively, governments could spend revenues on low-carbon infrastructure. The

actually reasonably priced, I would expect significant inflows. Valuation remains the single biggest pushback to increasing India weights.

5. There was deep disappointment over Indian corporate governance. Many were shocked with some of the recent instances of promoter fraud, leverage and balance sheet irregularities. Some of the disclosures in the financial services space in particular were deeply worrying. What were the auditors, rating agencies and regulators doing? The governance premium has increased and will continue expanding as more governance weaknesses are exposed. Allocators have been surprised by the extent of share pledges. Many argued India cannot be among the most expensive markets in the EM world with this level of governance.

6. Many allocators were aware that India was going through a clean-up of sorts, with many of the weaker companies and promoter groups being allowed to fall by the wayside. Most recognised that such a clean-up slows growth initially as the system adjusts. However, as the strong get stronger and gain share, the quality of growth improves and the economy recovers. Most also recognised that India has gone through a series of economic shocks over the past four years. First demonetisation, then the goods and services tax followed by the NBFC crisis. Thus the economy has not had the time to recover. Hopefully over the coming years, we can get back to a more normalised environment, and deliver our potential.

7. Most investors were surprised by the ferocity of the NBFC crisis. It truly has been a mini-Lehman moment for India. The crisis has effectively wiped out the business model of most of the wholesale players in the space. The cost to the economy has been enormous. Most blame the current slowdown largely to the funding challenges faced by NBFCs. Given the trust deficit, allocators felt that the RBI would have to provide comfort to investors on the quality of the underlying NBFC book. No one other than the RBI, they felt, could provide the comfort investors need to invest in the space. The only way the system will clear is by attracting private capital. Private capital has no trust in the rating agencies or auditors and needs comfort on the credibility of the disclosed asset quality and numbers. Only the RBI can break this knot. The disclosure obviously helps the two or three stronger NBFCs and the banks, as consolidation in the space is inevitable.

8. Most allocators were convinced that the tension between China and the US, was here to stay, irrespective of who is in the White House. Consequently, China will slow, and its economy has seen its peak growth. As it slows, at some point the leverage issues will surface. Most allocators were looking to increase their investments in Asia ex-China.

India has a real chance to attract flows over the coming year. Investors understand that both growth and earnings have bottomed and few are overweight the country. Allocators are looking for growth in a slowing world. Most still believe in the country's long-term potential. We are well-positioned to benefit, if we can only stabilise, not have another blow-up and be seen to drive a growth and reform agenda.

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INFLEXION POINTS
ARUNABHA GHOSH & VAIBHAV CHATURVEDI

The case for book publishing monopolies



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The other day I told my son I'd buy him a book. His curt response was, "Get with it, man". He meant no thanks, only Kindle.

The next day I offered my 75-year-old sister to buy her a book on Kindle. "Don't

be an ass," she said equally curtly.

A few weeks later, I was travelling around in Europe. Old and young, though only a small percentage, had iPads. The rest had their phones. I didn't see anyone carrying a book. No one. Nor was anybody reading from a Kindle. On iPad they could have been reading anything but on Kindle it had to be a book. So no Kindle, no book.

I asked myself if people actually read books on their phones because in iPhones you can download the Kindle app. It can be done — I do it occasionally — but it's not much fun. It's ok if it's a short story, just about. But a whole book is a peak too far for most people.

Nevertheless, lakhs of books are now available for reading on screens. But how many people actually read them? No one has any idea. My son, however, says everyone reads books on screens. But publishers

say very few. Clearly, there is an information problem here that needs solving.

In any case there don't seem to be many bookshops left anywhere in the world. And shops that sold secondhand books have almost completely disappeared. What happens to old books, then?

That problem aside, are people buying printed books online the way I do and, increasingly, most people I know also do? The discounts are very attractive. That seems to be the obvious answer to the disappearance problem, not least because it raises some interesting questions about the economics of publishing.

Degrees of competition

Ideally, from a supply-demand viewpoint, book publishing should be a monopoly in each country because, first, it would allow much-needed scale which is currently

missing and which, secondly, would allow massive cross-subsidisation between subjects and even genres. But exactly the opposite situation obtains in almost all countries.

If you think about it, this monopoly-type thing has already (almost) happened on the distribution side because of huge online aggregating platforms who access from small booksellers. Gone are the days when there were book shops that specialised in particular subjects.

There is a completely non-sentimental reason this should happen on the production side as well now. The current cottage or micro-industry structure is completely idiotic from every point of view. It helps no one.

This will infuriate many people who think that a monopoly will suppress certain types of books. That objection sounds noble but suppression happens even now,

except it's not called that. It's called market insufficiency, which is jargon for "no one will buy this rubbish".

The worst offenders here are the small publishers who operate with very little capital and even less editorial quality control. In fact, the capital inadequacy means these publishers necessarily have to be picky. The lack of quality control means the opposite. It's ridiculous.

In contrast a monopoly, because it can cross-subsidise, is unlikely to suppress anything. It is highly volume dependent and volumes need more variety, not less.

In that sense it's no different from a soap company which needs a few, huge brands and scores of other less successful ones. At one time Procter & Gamble had 70 brands of body soaps.

Monopolistic exploitation

Another objection to a monopoly could be that it will increase the base price of all books. Even the prices of bestsellers could, or will, double for no good reason

at all. Greed will dominate pricing.

This is possible but not probable. I would like to see a single multi-brand monopoly that indulges in price gouging in its most successful brands. It is a problem but probably not a serious one in the books business.

Had it been so every publisher who signs up a bestselling author and thus becomes a monopolist would have exploited the opportunity because it would help the suppliers of books — the authors and the publishers — immensely. Both would make more money. But the opposite has happened. Bestsellers are the lowest priced. That's how the market works.

There remains the question whether if print nearly vanishes, would a monopoly be good for electronic books. Absolutely, because then even the distributor could be eliminated.

When will this happen? In the next two decades. It's happened to films. So why not books, too?